Standing Committee A

[Mr. Roger Galein the Chair]

Roger Gale: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Before we proceed, I understand that having decided not to sit on Tuesday evening the Committee is now considering sitting later this evening. That, of course, is entirely in order and I am perfectly happy to take the Chair, as I am at the service of the Committee. Mrs. Humble, however, is not available. That being so, if we run past a certain point—and it will be the Chairman who will decide when that point is—I shall suspend the Committee in the interests of the comfort of both the staff and, dare I say, myself.

Clause 67

Statements indicating benefits for charitable institutions and fund-raisers

Amendment moved [this day]: No. 128, in clause 67, page 71, line 14, at end insert—
‘(6) After subsection (9) insert—
“The Charity Commission shall have power to initiate criminal proceedings in respect of offences under subsection (9).”Â ’.—[Mr. Andrew Turner.]

Roger Gale: I remind the Committee that with this we are taking the following: Clause stand part.
Amendment No. 131, in clause 68, page 73, line 22, at end add—
“60C Fundraising by sale of products and services
(1) Save in the case of small outlets, where the sale of any goods or service is represented as benefiting a charity or charities, the vendor shall indicate either the proportion or the amount of the sale price which will be passed to the charity or charities for their unrestricted benefit.
(2) Indications under subsection (1) above may be made in diagramatic form, and shall be made in writing, the font-size of which shall be no smaller than the price of the goods or service.
(3) For the purpose of this section, a “small outlet” is an organisation which is not obliged to register for Value Added Tax purposes.”.’.
Clause 68 stand part.

Andrew Turner: It is a great pleasure to see you in your place, Mr. Gale. Let us hope that we will not see you there for long.
The last words I used before we broke for lunch, although lunch is only a fleeting hope in the minds of most members of the Committee, were “10 pence”. I apologise; I should have said 10 per cent. Boots has a standard rake-off—or return—to charities of 10 per cent., but that varies hugely from outlet to outlet.
I am pleased to say that during the break I was able to discuss with the Parliamentary Secretary the purport of the amendment. He has assured me that clause 67(4) has the effect of tightening the law currently set out in section 60(3) of the Charities Act 1992. The 1992 Act states that “any commercial participator”—I had not understood that that meant a shop such as Clinton Cards—that makes any representation that
“charitable contributions are to be given to or applied for the benefit of one or more particular charitable institutions,”
is obliged to make a statement, which is broadly in accordance with the effect of my amendment. I am deeply concerned by the apparent failure of even respectable outlets such as Boots, Tesco and Marks and Spencer to recognise that duty under the law, but I am pleased that the Government propose to tighten the provision.
I shall now move on to what might have been a stand part debate on clauses 67 and 68, which again has benefited from discussions over lunch. I have received representations from the Association of Fundraising Consultants that the existing law, particularly section 60(2) of the 1992 Act, is not working effectively. The association’s solution is to reduce the impact of that law and to set aside the changes that the Government propose to make to that section of the Act.
People are genuinely concerned about how much of their money is spent on fundraising. A lot of people say, “Well, it’s all charity money,” and—to revert to an earlier debate—in law, of course, it is all charity money, because it is there for the charities to dispose of in whatever way it wishes, as long as it is for the general charitable purpose. None the less, people are concerned about fundraising and the amount of money that may be devoted to it by certain charities. Some charities spend as little as £300 to raise £10,000, whereas some spend in excess of £900 to raise the same sum. On average, it is the largest charities that have the worst return on money spent on fundraising, and the smallest charities that have the best return on the money that they invest. That offers a lesson: people are entitled to know how much of the money is being spent on what might be described as a job creation scheme for professional middle classes, and how much of it will genuinely help real people at the front line, which is, after all, the purpose of most people’s charitable giving.
I have a lot of sympathy with the suggestion of the Association of Fundraising Consultants that the amendments to the 1992 Act proposed in the Bill would not have the effect that the Government desire, because they would not be sufficiently robust to stand up against the wide range of different ways in which professional fundraisers are funded. However, the principal point made by the AFC is that charities, and charity trustees in particular, should have a clear responsibility for deciding how effectively money is spent on fundraising. That is my position, also.
I am grateful to the association for the information it has provided. I fear that neither the existing provisions, nor the proposed provisions will be good enough for what the Government want to achieve and, I suspect, what most people want to achieve, which is to ensure a high rate of return on money spent on fundraising. We are not getting that from the largest charities at the moment.

Martin Horwood: It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr. Gale. Some of the statements that have just been made by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Mr. Turner) contained so many red herrings that he could open a fish shop. Despite my background, I shall not take his pejorative statements personally, especially his comments on fundraising by the larger charities, which the Parliamentary Secretary described from a sedentary position as an outrageous slur. I have to concur.
The hon. Gentleman was wrong about many things. The ratio of expenditure to income is important and it is dealt with properly by most of the larger charities. According to the type of fundraising pursued, those ratios sometimes look worse and sometimes look better. The areas that benefit from a large volunteer input, which is, in effect, free naturally achieve a good ratio; that is often true of small charities, as the hon. Gentleman rightly pointed out. However, some small charities indulge in special events fundraising of the type that is relatively inefficient, such as large gala dinners that make only a little more than they cost to put on. Such issues are a matter of detail and variation throughout the whole charities sector and his wild generalisations were pretty wide of the mark.
I do not have huge sympathy for the case putby the Association of Fundraising Consultants. The importance of the clauses designed to strengthen section 60 of the 1992 Act arises from the fact that weaknesses have been identified in the application of that provision. The hon. Gentleman was right to mention charity Christmas cards. The issue is not the costs that are taken by the charities, but those commercial participators—the organisations such as supermarkets and other retailers that help charities to fund raise, but are not themselves professional fundraisers—that represent themselves as raising charitable funds for a benevolent or philanthropic purpose but, in practice, do not ultimately give much money to the charity in question. That is a legitimate concern. In recent years, I have been worried about the fact that, although section 60 of the 1992 Act was well drafted and well intentioned, it has been pretty widely ignored. When walking down an average high street, one sees many examples of things that purport to be charitable or imply that they are for a charitable purpose that simply ignore section 60 of the 1992 Act. I therefore broadly welcome clauses 66, 67 and 68.
It is right that we seek to tighten protection for efficient, legitimate fundraising. The onus is on the Parliamentary Secretary to take on his responsibilities as Minister for the third sector. He should consider the enforcement and the practical application of the provisions and ensure that the Charity Commission and others concerned with enforcement find a mechanism to make it easy for people to report breaches. I suspect that many breaches are inadvertent and quite innocent. The hon. Member for Isle of Wight mentioned businesses such as Tesco and John Lewis, which contribute a great deal to charity. Perhaps I should declare an interest as the director of fundraising who managed to secure the designation of Tesco charity of the year for the Alzheimer’s Society. I worked closely with Tesco and I think that its record on corporate responsibility and support for charity is very good. If it has inadvertently breached the law, I am sure that it was not with the intent of deceiving the public.
Nevertheless, the fact the breaches occur fairly routinely clearly opens the door for less scrupulous individuals to make a healthy profit out of apparently charitable sales and activities that do not benefit charities very much. So broadly speaking, I welcome the clauses.

Edward Miliband: This had been a good-tempered Committee until the hon. Member for Isle of Wight launched a scathing attack on the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) through his comments on the professional middle classes, but I am sure that good humour will prevail eventually.
I shall talk briefly to amendments Nos. 128 and 131. The first seems like it was discussed a long time ago by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight. I hope to reassure him by pointing out that there is an offence suchas the amendment proposes under section 60(9) ofthe Charities Act 1992. The commission is not a prosecuting authority in that or any other respect, but his amendment would make it so by giving the commission the ability to initiate criminal proceedings. That would constitute a significant change in its role. As I said, the criminal offence exists and it is for the commission to draw offences to the attention of the police and for the Crown Prosecution Service to authorise a prosecution where appropriate.

Andrew Turner: Is it within the capacity of trading standards authorities to prosecute such cases?

Edward Miliband: It is. But let me say more generally—this relates to amendment No. 131 as well—that I take the points made by the hon. Members for Isle of Wight and for Cheltenham. There is concern about the failure to enforce the existing regime adequately. Clause 67(4) strengthens that regime and makes clearer the requirements on commercial participators to provide information on the destination of moneys derived from the sale of goods and services. However, I acknowledge that the commission needs to investigate breaches properly and to make it clear that it is happy to do so, and to draw attention to the ability of members of the public to take up issues with them. It will not be for the commission to decide to prosecute, but it has a big responsibility.
I hope that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight is reassured about the strengthening of the provisions. Let us hope that it will make a difference in practice. With that, I hope that he will withdraw his amendment.

Andrew Turner: The “wild allegations” were supported by information from the National Council for Voluntary Organisations and printed in its voluntary sector almanac for 2004. That information shows that every £10,000 raised by charities with an income of less than £100,000 costs £311 and every £10,000 raised by charities with an income in excess of £10 million costs £929.

Martin Horwood: That is because smaller charities often do not employ paid staff. It is nothing to do with the efficiency of the fundraising, but to do with the fact that larger charities tend to employ staff and smaller ones do not.

Andrew Turner: I sense a vested interest, although not a current one. I welcome the fact that charities recruit volunteers to do their fundraising.
Section 60(3)(c)(i) of the 1992 Act says that the commercial participator shall accompany the offer for sale with a statement clearly indicating:
“what proportion of the consideration given for goods or services sold or supplied by him...is to be given to or applied for the benefit of the institution or institutions concerned”.
It is frightening to find that, however good it is generally, Tesco has not read that bit of the law. I am sure that it would not avoid reading the relevant bit of the food safety legislation, but perhaps I am wrong.
I accept the Parliamentary Secretary’s acknowledgement that it is not the Charity Commission’s responsibility to prosecute; in fact, it should draw things to the attention of the police or trading standards. I also welcome the suggestion that the Charity Commission must investigate potential breaches a lot more rigorously.
The Parliamentary Secretary did not answer well the points raised by the AFC, but he is attempting to strengthen the law, not to introduce unnecessary regulation, and we will have to judge it by its effect. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 67 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 69

Reserve power to control fund-raising by charitable institutions

Roger Gale: We now come to amendmentNo. 157, with which it will be convenient to take amendments Nos. 158, 77 and 159. I call Mr. Turner.

Andrew Turner: I was concerned about whether the Secretary of State would exercise the powers in respect of large charities. However, we have discussed enough the expenditure of large charities and whether further regulation is needed, so I do not propose to move the amendment.

Clause 69 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 70

Power of Secretary of State to give financial assistance to charitable, benevolent or philanthropic institutions

Andrew Turner: I beg to move amendment No. 47, in clause 70, page 75, line 16, after ‘conditions’, insert
‘, which shall be proportionate to the risk of loss or abuse of public money and the capacity of the institution to comply therewith,’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 48, in clause 70, page 75, line 16, at end insert—
‘(3A) Where financial assistance is given in return for the delivery of a service, the Secretary of State shall ensure that a reasonable opportunity is given to a range of institutions to offer to deliver to the service.’.
No. 49, in clause 71, page 76, line 25, after ‘conditions’, insert
‘, which shall be proportionate to the risk of loss or abuse of public money and the capacity of the institution to comply therewith,’.
No. 50, in clause 71, page 76, line 25, at end insert—
‘(3A) Where financial assistance is given in return for the delivery of a service, the assembly shall ensure that a reasonable opportunity is given to a range of institutions to offer to deliver to the service.’.

Andrew Turner: There are two purposes to these amendments. Amendments Nos. 47 and 48 would require a degree of proportionality in the Secretary of State’s activities. I am concerned about regulation being introduced through the back door. However, it is likely that I shall accept suitable assurances from the Parliamentary Secretary in that respect.
Amendments Nos. 49 and 50 deal with how Governments—not just the present one—sometimes feel the need to set up a charitable vehicle to undertake part of their activities even though there might already be a suitable vehicle to undertake the work. The example I have in mind is the Experience Corps, the purpose of which was to encourage more people to get involved in charities, particularly people close to or beyond retirement age. I had a conversation with the director of one organisation who questioned whether her organisation would not have been equally capable of doing exactly the same job, without the establishment of an organisation that began to look like a Government vehicle rather than a genuine charity and that cost a huge amount of money.
In a parliamentary answer to me on 12 September 2005, the hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale, East (Paul Goggins), then a Home Office Minister, told me that the Experience Corps
“received approximately £20 million from the Home Office”
and that its
“target was to recruit 250,000 new volunteers”.
However, as of December 2003, it had only
“recruited over 153,000 volunteers”.—[Official Report, 12 September 2005; Vol. 436, c. 2633W.]
Even my arithmetic is up to calculating that that works out at £130,000 per volunteer. Sometimes we ought to ask the Government whether they could not have acted more efficiently. That is the purpose of amendments Nos. 48 and 50.

Edward Miliband: I sympathise with the intentions behind the amendments, but I hope that I can satisfy the hon. Gentleman that they are unnecessary.
On amendments Nos. 47 and 49, the compact of good practice, which was agreed between the Government and the voluntary sector and with which the hon. Gentleman will be familiar, is important because it covers precisely the issues that he discussed, including proportionality in monitoring requirements. He was right to raise the matter, because the interaction between the Government and the voluntary sector is important and we must get our practice right in that area. I do not think that the hon. Gentleman’s amendments would add all that much to what already exists, but I am sympathetic to the intentions behind them.
I shall deal briefly with amendments Nos. 48 and 50. Again, I agree with the hon. Gentleman’s view, but the distinction that I would draw is that the Government are often not best placed to disburse funds. It should not necessarily be the job of the new Office of the Third Sector to spend lots of time filtering grant applications. For example, V, a new charity for young people, will distribute resources on an arm’s length and independent basis to organisations that encourage volunteering opportunities for young people. It is better to use the voluntary sector’s expertise to do that sort of thing than to do it within Government.
However, that does not detract from the hon. Gentleman’s point. When the Government consider setting up new vehicles and institutions, we must be careful not to duplicate existing bodies that could do the job better. The compact is designed to cover that, too. I take his point in both cases, but hope that on the basis of reassuring words and firm intentions on my part, he will withdraw his amendments.

Peter Bottomley: May I ask the Minister to help the Committee on a couple of points? Subsection (6) says that the Secretary of State
“may make arrangements for...assistance under subsection (1) to be given”—
that is, financial assistance—or he may delegate the matter. Could the hon. Gentleman give the Committee one or two illustrative examples of hypothetical or actual cases in which the Secretary of State might want that power?
Subsection (10)(b) mentions
“an institution (other than a charity) which is established for charitable, benevolent or philanthropic purposes.”
I am not too concerned about the benevolent or philanthropic purposes, but will the Minister give an illustrative example of something that is not a charity that is established for charitable purposes?

Roger Gale: I call the Minister.

Edward Miliband: I thought you might be about to call the hon. Member for Isle of Wight, Mr. Gale, but sadly not.

Roger Gale: Order. The Minister is not compelled to respond, but if I call the hon. Member for Isle of Wight, I shall wind up the debate.

Edward Miliband: No, I am happy to respond, Mr. Gale. I was not seeking to question the Chair and your wisdom.
I answered the first question put by the hon. Member for Worthing, West (Peter Bottomley) in my previous remarks. An example such as he asks for is an institution that is set up by the Government and disburses Government funds. Such bodies include V, which is encouraging youth volunteering, and Future Builders, which is providing loans and grants to institutions and charities that want to help deliver public services.
An example of an institution other than a charity that is established for charitable purposes is Amnesty International, which is not a charity but does have charitable purposes. I hope that that is helpful to him and the Committee.

Andrew Turner: I am grateful for the warm words of the Minister. I am even more grateful for his firm intentions. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 70 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 71 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 72

Report on operation of this Act

Martin Horwood: I beg to move amendment No. 156, in clause 72, page 77, line 20, at end insert—
‘(Z1) The Secretary of State must, one year after the year in which this Act is passed and each year subsequently, make a statement to the House of Commons, which must address the following matters—
(a) the number of registered charities in England and Wales, and an indication of whether this number has risen or fallen since the previous statement,
(b) the number of organisations which have failed to obtain or retain charitable status under sections 2 or 3 of this Act in that year, and why they have failed,
(c) the total value of Gift Aid and other special tax provisions for registered charities in that year,
(d) the total net cost of Value Added Tax to registered charities in that year, and
(e) the number and value of central government contracts placed with registered charities in that year.’.
The amendment is straightforward and I hope that it will command widespread support and sympathy in the Committee—

Edward Miliband: No.

Martin Horwood: The Minister may not realise the opportunity that he is missing with this amendment.
The clause obliges the Minister to report on the operation of the Act not later than in five years’ time, but some of the conditions and changes to charity law that we have been discussing, may have immediate implications for charities and change the way in which charity registration happens. They might also change and even challenge the effectiveness of the Charity Commission. It is therefore important that we have an annual review of the sector’s operation.
The implications for the sector are wider than simply the provisions in the clauses that we have discussed in this Committee. The relationship between the Government and the private and voluntary sectors in terms of the delivery of services and public policy objectives is a legitimate subject for regular review. Review does take place, but on a piecemeal basis, together with occasional debates on volunteering in Westminster Hall and ministerial speeches on particular projects. It would therefore be valuable to have a well rounded and concentrated report each year. The members of the Committee are extremely well informed on the third sector, but we may be in a minority among our colleagues in terms of a real knowledge of the way in which the sector is operating. 
As I have said in the amendment, reviewing the changes in the number of registered charities—whether that number is rising or falling—may reveal trends resulting from the changes to charity registration in the Bill. The number of organisations that have failed to attain or to retain charitable status is clearly relevant to the changed arrangements in relation to the new heads of charity and the public benefit test. There are differing views on the public benefit test—whether it represents a continuation of the status quo, as the Government believe, or operates tighter guidance, as I would wish, or offers a privileged position to private schools, as the hon. Member for Isle of Wight and his colleagues would prefer. Those matters should be discussed and any legitimate concerns about the operation of the public benefit test could then be revealed sooner rather than later.
We could discuss the total value of gift aid and other special tax provisions for charities in that year. That would provide an opportunity for the Parliamentary Secretary to parade the extraordinary generosity of Government towards charities in the form of the various tax breaks and concessions that it offers to them. However, in fairness, the report should also include the total net cost of value added tax to registered charities. The amount that it costs the many charities that are not able to recover VAT because they do not sell anything is a matter of concern in the sector. That is, in effect, a tax on charities, which those of us who are sympathetic to the third sector ought to be lobbying our respective Treasury teams to tackle through amended policies. The review that I propose would offer an opportunity for the issue to be discussed in Parliament in a cool-headed, rational and well informed way.
Finally, a report on the number and value of central Government contracts placed with registered charities in the relevant year would help to illustrate the developing relationship between charity, the private sector and the Government.
The amendment is balanced and reasonable, and would introduce a welcome opportunity for Parliament to discuss the values and development of the third sector in a well informed way.

Edward Miliband: If I were giving star ratings to the hon. Gentleman’s amendments, amendment No. 72 would be low down the list—indeed, I am not sure that it would receive more than one star. Let me explain why.
The matters set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) of proposed new subsection (Z1) are for the Charity Commission, which will have to provide an annual report to Parliament. Paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) have only tangential relevance to the Bill. However many important claims I would make for the Bill, I would not claim that it will have a huge impact on the operation of gift aid, the total net cost of value added tax or the number and value of central Government contracts, although that is not to say that some of the other things that are being done will not affect them. All Departments produce an annual report, which will certainly cover issues such as those that the hon. Gentleman has raised.

Martin Horwood: If the Minister were to give an assurance that his Department’s annual report will cover all the subjects in the amendment, I would happily withdraw it.

Edward Miliband: I will not do that, but I shall give the hon. Gentleman the assurance that we will attempt to cover the issues that he raises, while of course respecting the fact that tax—as I am sure even the Liberal Democrats know—is a matter for Her Majesty’s Treasury. I would not want to trespass upon that territory, but I am sure that the more general issues affecting the charitable sector will be covered in the annual report.

Peter Bottomley: While the Minister is dealing gently and fairly with the hon. Member for Cheltenham, could he tell the Committee what kind of person he might have in mind to commence the review? Also, given that the clause says that the review should start within five years of the passing of the legislation, roughly how long does the Minister think the review might take?

Edward Miliband: I believe that the review is to be conducted by central Government. That is the commitment made in the Bill. If the hon. Gentleman is proposing himself a potential reviewer, I am sure that he will be considered by the relevant Minister at the time. No doubt the hon. Gentleman has important qualifications in that respect.
Peter Bottomleyrose—

Edward Miliband: I was going to say that I hoped that the hon. Gentleman would be satisfied with that, but I should have known better.

Peter Bottomley: If it was intended that central Government conduct the review, the Bill would make that plain, but subsection (1) states:
“The Secretary of State must, before the end of the period of five years beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, appoint a person to review generally the operation of this Act.”
I am not saying that Minister ought to know five years in advance the name of the person who might be appointed, but perhaps on Report he can give an illustrative example of how that appointment might take place and say whether the report should be completed within one or two years.

Edward Miliband: I give that undertaking.

Martin Horwood: I am grateful to the Minister for his comments, from which I take some comfort. If he is going to attempt to address the relative benefits of the various tax breaks and the tax cost of irrecoverable VAT in his annual report, as I think he undertook to do—
Edward Milibandindicated dissent.

Martin Horwood: Well, he said that he would attempt to cover those issues. I am sure that his hon. Friends in the Treasury would look kindly on his addressing at least the impact of the tax implications of VAT on sector, but if that is not possible, perhaps he could encourage the Chancellor to do so another time. Under those circumstances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 72 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 73

Orders and regulations

Edward Miliband: I beg to move amendmentNo. 191, in clause 73, page 78, line 16, at end insert—
‘(ba) any regulations under section (Disclosure of information to and by Northern Ireland regulator),’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendments Nos. 192, 194 to 199 and 193.
Government new clause 14—Disclosure of information to and by Northern Ireland regulator.

Edward Miliband: The amendments are relatively technical. I apologise to the Committee for their late tabling on Tuesday. We have tried to avoid tabling bundles of amendments at the last minute, but it took longer to prepare these amendments than I had hoped. I shall briefly explain what they will do.
The revised version of section 10 of the Charities Act 1993 provides for the disclosure of information to and by the Charity Commission. It includes specific provisions relating to the exchange of information by the commissioners for Revenue and Customs.
The purpose of the Government amendments is fourfold. First, they will modernise the information-sharing gateway between the commissioners for Revenue and Customs and the Charity Commission to reflect changes to the way in which HMRC wishes to disclose information following the passing of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005. Secondly, the amendments will extend the gateway for the sharing of information, including Revenue and Customs information, to principal regulators of exempt charities. Thirdly, they make provision for sharing of information including commissioners of Revenue and Customs’ information with the proposed regulator of charities in Northern Ireland. Finally, they make some minor changes to the rules governing disclosure of other information to and by the Charity Commission. I hope that that brief explanation satisfies the Committee.

Peter Bottomley: I am sure that what the Minister has outlined makes sense. I congratulate peopleon spotting one or two of the moves from “commissioners” to “commission”, which are a consequence of earlier parts of the Bill.
Is Government new clause 14 precedented? The Minister will know that it relates to the provision whereby, if a charity commission in Northern Ireland is established, various other things happen. I can see the reason for the new clause, and it makes sense, but is it a legislative innovation?

Edward Miliband: I gather that it is not a legislative innovation.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 192, in clause 73, page 78, line 21, after ‘(b),’ insert ‘(ba),’.—[Edward Miliband.]

Clause 73, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 74

Amendments, repeals, revocations and transitional provisions

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Peter Bottomley: I think that the clause is drafted to provide a sensible and limited power. The guts of it are subsections (4) and (5). Subsection (4) states:
“The Secretary of State may by order make—
(a) such supplementary, incidental or consequential provision, or
(b) such transitory, transitional or saving provision
as he considers appropriate for the general purposes, or any particular purpose of this Act or in consequence of, or for giving full effect to, any provision made by this Act.”
Subsection (5) states:
“An order made under subsection (4) may amend, repeal, revoke or otherwise modify any enactment.”
The first three subsections of the clause are relevant to schedules 8, 9 and 10, but subsections (4) and (5) are not tied to them. I am not suggesting that the Minister has created the opportunity to drove a coach and horses through any part of charity law provision, but I would like the Committee to have his reassurance on what the limitations are.

Edward Miliband: My understanding is that there are constraints in the legislation, but to be fair to the hon. Gentleman, I should write to him and set them out on paper.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 74 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 8

Minor and consequential amendments

Amendment made: No. 180, in schedule 8, page 133, line 17, at end insert—

None

14A (1) Section 5 of the Police, Factories, &c. (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1916 (regulation of street collections) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1) for “the benefit of charitable or other purposes,” substitute “any purposes in circumstances not involving the making of a charitable appeal,”.
(3) In paragraph (b) of the proviso to subsection (1) omit the words from “, and no representation” onwards.
(4) In subsection (4) before the definition of “street” insert—
““charitable appeal” has the same meaning as in Chapter 1 of Part 3 of the Charities Act 2006;”’.—[Edward Miliband.]

Edward Miliband: I beg to move amendmentNo. 181, in schedule 8, page 138, line 24, at end insert—

‘Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (c. 65)

In section 21A of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (public authorities) in paragraph 14 in the Table of Exceptions in subsection (9), for “Charity Commissioners for England and Wales” substitute “Charity Commission”.’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 182, 59 to 61, 63 and 64 and 184 to 187.

Edward Miliband: The group consists entirely of minor or technical amendments.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 182, in schedule 8, page 143, leave out lines 21 to 29.
No. 183, in schedule 8, page 144, line 31, at end insert—
‘91A In section 79 (short title, commencement and extent) omit—
(a) in subsection (6), the words “(subject to subsection (7))”, and
(b) subsection (7).
91B In Schedule 7 (repeals) omit the entry relating to the Police, Factories, &c. (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1916 (c. 31).’.
No. 59, in schedule 8, page 144, line 33, at end insert—
‘92A In the heading for Part 1, for “CHARITY COMMISSIONERS” substitute “CHARITY COMMISSION”.’.
No. 194, in schedule 8, page 145, line 32, leave out ‘COMMISSION’S’.
No. 195, in schedule 8, page 146, line 32, leave out paragraph 99 and insert—
‘99 For section 10 substitute—
“10 Disclosure of information to Commission
(1) Any relevant public authority may disclose information to the Commission if the disclosure is made for the purpose of enabling or assisting the Commission to discharge any of its functions.
(2) But Revenue and Customs information may be disclosed under subsection (1) only if it relates to an institution, undertaking or body falling within one (or more) of the following paragraphs—
(a) a charity;
(b) an institution which is established for charitable, benevolent or philanthropic purposes;
(c) an institution by or in respect of which a claim for exemption has at any time been made under section 505(1) of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988;
(d) a subsidiary undertaking of a charity;
(e) a body entered in the Scottish Charity Register which is managed or controlled wholly or mainly in or from England or Wales.
(3) In subsection (2)(d) above “subsidiary undertaking of a charity” means an undertaking (as defined by section 259(1) of the Companies Act 1985) in relation to which—
(a) a charity is (or is to be treated as) a parent undertaking in accordance with the provisions of section 258 of, and Schedule 10A to, the Companies Act 1985, or
(b) two or more charities would, if they were a single charity, be (or be treated as) a parent undertaking in accordance with those provisions.
(4) For the purposes of the references to a parent undertaking—
(a) in subsection (3) above, and
(b) in section 258 of, and Schedule 10A to, the Companies Act 1985 as they apply for the purposes of that subsection,
“undertaking” includes a charity which is not an undertaking as defined by section 259(1) of that Act.
10A Disclosure of information by Commission
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) below, the Commission may disclose to any relevant public authority any information received by the Commission in connection with any of the Commission’s functions—
(a) if the disclosure is made for the purpose of enabling or assisting the relevant public authority to discharge any of its functions, or
(b) if the information so disclosed is otherwise relevant to the discharge of any of the functions of the relevant public authority.
(2) In the case of information disclosed to the Commission under section 10(1) above, the Commission’s power to disclose the information under subsection (1) above is exercisable subject to any express restriction subject to which the information was disclosed to the Commission.
(3) Subsection (2) above does not apply in relation to Revenue and Customs information disclosed to the Commission under section 10(1) above; but any such information may not be further disclosed (whether under subsection (1) above or otherwise) except with the consent of the Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs.
(4) Any responsible person who discloses information in contravention of subsection (3) above is guilty of an offence and liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine, or both.
(5) It is a defence for a responsible person charged with an offence under subsection (4) above of disclosing information to prove that he reasonably believed—
(a) that the disclosure was lawful, or
(b) that the information had already and lawfully been made available to the public.
(6) In the application of this section to Scotland or Northern Ireland, the reference to 12 months in subsection (4) is to be read as a reference to 6 months.
(7) In this section “responsible person” means a person who is or was—
(a) a member of the Commission,
(b) a member of the staff of the Commission,
(c) a person acting on behalf of the Commission or a member of the staff of the Commission, or
(d) a member of a committee established by the Commission.
10B Disclosure to and by principal regulators of exempt charities
(1) Sections 10 and 10A above apply with the modifications in subsections (2) to (4) below in relation to the disclosure of information to or by the principal regulator of an exempt charity.
(2) References in those sections to the Commission or to any of its functions are to be read as references to the principal regulator of an exempt charity or to any of the functions of that body or person as principal regulator in relation to the charity.
(3) Section 10 above has effect as if for subsections (2) and (3) there were substituted—
“(2) But Revenue and Customs information may be disclosed under subsection (1) only if it relates to—
(a) the exempt charity in relation to which the principal regulator has functions as such, or
(b) a subsidiary undertaking of the exempt charity.
(3) In subsection (2)(b) above “subsidiary undertaking of the exempt charity” means an undertaking (as defined by section 259(1) of the Companies Act 1985) in relation to which—
(a) the exempt charity is (or is to be treated as) a parent undertaking in accordance with the provisions of section 258 of, and Schedule 10A to, the Companies Act 1985, or
(b) the exempt charity and one or more other charities would, if they were a single charity, be (or be treated as) a parent undertaking in accordance with those provisions.”
(4) Section 10A above has effect as if for the definition of “responsible person” in subsection (7) there were substituted a definition specified by regulations under section 13(4)(b) of the Charities Act 2006 (regulations prescribing principal regulators).
(5) Regulations under that section may also make such amendments or other modifications of any enactment as the Secretary of State considers appropriate for securing that any disclosure provisions that would otherwise apply in relation to the principal regulator of an exempt charity do not apply in relation to that body or person in its or his capacity as principal regulator.
(6) In subsection (5) above “disclosure provisions” means provisions having effect for authorising, or otherwise in connection with, the disclosure of information by or to the principal regulator concerned.
10C Disclosure of information: supplementary
(1) In sections 10 and 10A above “relevant public authority” means—
(a) any government department (including a Northern Ireland department),
(b) any local authority,
(c) any constable, and
(d) any other body or person discharging functions of a public nature (including a body or person discharging regulatory functions in relation to any description of activities).
(2) In section 10A above “relevant public authority” also includes any body or person within subsection (1)(d) above in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom.
(3) In sections 10 to 10B above and this section—
“enactment” has the same meaning as in the Charities Act 2006;
“Revenue and Customs information” means information held as mentioned in section 18(1) of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005.
(4) Nothing in sections 10 and 10A above (or in those sections as applied by section 10B(1) to (4) above) authorises the making of a disclosure which—
(a) contravenes the Data Protection Act 1998, or
(b) is prohibited by Part 1 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.”’.
No. 60, in schedule 8, page 148, line 41, after ‘was”,’, insert—
‘(ba) for “they act” substitute “it acts”,’.—[Edward Miliband.]

Martin Horwood: I beg to move amendmentNo. 104, in schedule 8, page 149, line 14, after ‘manager’, insert
‘(who will otherwise be known as an interim trustee as appropriate)’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 106, in schedule 8, page 149, line 14, after ‘manager’, insert ‘or interim trustee as appropriate’.
Amendment No. 107, in schedule 8, page 150, line 6, after ‘manager’, insert ‘or interim trustee as appropriate’.
Amendment No. 108, in schedule 8, page 150, line 11, after second ‘manager’, insert ‘or interim trustee as appropriate’.
Amendment No. 109, in schedule 8, page 150, line 13, after ‘manager’, insert ‘or interim trustee as appropriate’.
Amendment No. 110, in schedule 8, page 150, line 15, after second ‘manager’, insert ‘or interim trustee as appropriate’.
Amendment No. 111, in schedule 8, page 150, line 19, after second ‘manager’, insert ‘or interim trustee as appropriate’.
New clause 3—Reasons for appointing an interim manager of a charity—
‘In section 19 of the 1993 Act, after subsection (1), insert—
“(1A) Within seven days of an appointment under subsection (1), the Commission must communicate in writing to—
(a) the persons who are or claim to be the charity trustees of the institution concerned; and
(b) (if a body corporate) the institution which is the subject of such an appointment;
the reasons why they consider such an appointment necessary and appropriate.”’.
New clause 4—Remuneration of an interim manager of a charity—
‘In section 19 of the 1993 Act—
(a) in subsection (5) leave out “the charity concerned” and insert “the commission”;
(b) in subsection (6) leave out “out of the income from the charities concerned” and insert “by the commission”.’.
New clause 5—Amendment of section 19 of the 1993 Act—
‘Section 19 of the 1993 Act in subsection (3) is amended by inserting after “as they think fit”, the words “, who may, where appropriate to the size of the charity and expertise required by the charity, act in a voluntary capacity.”’.
New clause 9—Appointment and payment of the Receiver and Manager—
‘(1) In section 19(1) of the Charities Act 1993, at end insert “subject to a public tender exercise conducted in line with best practice from the Office of Government Commerce.”
(2) In section 19(6)(b) of the Charities Act 1993 (c. 10), after “the income of the charities concerned”, insert “subject to a public tender exercise and up to a sum agreed in such an exercise, any additional costs to be met by the Commission.”’.

Martin Horwood: Amendment No. 104 is extremely important. It deals with an issue about which much concern has been expressed by certain charities: the title of receiver and manager that is used when the Charity Commission steps in and changes a charity’s administration.
Receivers and managers have a very wide remit, and the proposed title of interim manager is a misleading one. Only a small proportion of receivers and managers who have been appointed have had the kind of narrow remit to which the term “interim manager” might be appropriate. Using the Freedom of Information Act 2000, the Association for Charities has obtained details of 51 receiver and manager appointments between 1993 and the end of June 2005. The vast majority of those appointments excluded trustees: in effect, the existing trustees were taken out of the charity’s administration and the temporary receiver and manager was inserted. To all intents and purposes that is an interim trustee appointment.
The importance of the phraseology is twofold. First, it makes the real status of such persons clear, and removes the confusion that has undoubtedly existed in the past, sometimes among trustees and former trustees of the charity and sometimes even among the receivers and managers, if the evidence from the Association for Charities be believed. The association has even cited evidence of confusion among commission staff. Secondly, and perhaps more important, is the message that is sent to people who support the charity. In any circumstances, beneficiaries’ interests are best served by an organisation that is properly administered, either by the original trustees or by an interim receiver and manager, and that can carry on its legitimate charitable activities with the maximum possible funding. That depends absolutely on public confidence and often depends also on continuing public donations. If the public are told that a receiver, or even an interim manager, has been appointed, a confusing signal is sent that might cast doubt over whether the charity is in crisis, and that doubt might deter them from donating. The term “interim trustee” is much less value-laden and much less threatening.

Peter Bottomley: Many members of the Committee have had the chance to read the schedule produced by the Association for Charities, but will the hon. Gentleman tell us for how long, on average, such people remain in post? Will he confirm whether any of them were appointed because there was not a crisis?

Martin Horwood: I cannot answer the hon. Gentleman’s first question. I am sure that most receivers and managers were appointed because of real concerns, and even the Association for Charities document cites cases that I would describe as being arguable either way. In some cases, there are legitimate arguments for the commission having to intervene. However, that does not mean that it is right unnecessarily to damage public confidence in a charity, especially since, if the commission is really worried about how it is being administered, the very act of appointing a receiver and manager is done with the intention of bringing the charity back into line. The idea is that it will then be properly administered and that the receiver and manger will continue to administer it in the best way possible.

James Duddridge: The hon. Gentleman is eloquently making the case for the title of “interim trustee”. However, I am worried that the use of “trustee” might confer additional legal responsibilities for the organisation that people would not be willing to accept, especially financial responsibilities. While it sets the right tone, is there not a tight legal definition of a trustee? It would cause confusion.

Martin Horwood: That is a valid point, but if the existing trustees have been displaced and excluded, which is what has happened in the majority of cases, the person appointed to be the receiver and manager, interim manager, or interim trustee—whatever we call him—might be taking on the legal responsibilities of trusteeship and certainly the responsibility to comply with charity law that applies to the trustees who have been excluded. I cannot see who else would take on that responsibility in such circumstances.

Andrew Turner: The hon. Gentleman seems to be asserting, as I believe the Association for Charities does, that we cannot have a charity without trustees and that the most senior person who appears to be administering the charity becomes the trustee, whether they want to or not, for the charity’s purposes and its resources. Therefore, an interim whatever is a trustee in law even if he did not intend to be.

Martin Horwood: The hon. Gentleman may well be right, although I am not necessarily asserting that the individual becomes a trustee. My legal qualifications are not such that I could say whether the person would become a trustee in law, but in that appointment he would certainly seem to carry the responsibilities of a trustee and, thus, be acting as if he were a trustee. That is why the amendment is sensible. It would protect the interests of beneficiaries by maintaining public confidence in the charity and stop the confusion and dispute over the role of receivers and managers that has been present in the past.

Andrew Turner: I am pleased to support the amendment. The role of the proposed interim manager, who has hitherto been called the receiver and manager, needs to be bottomed out and made more clear in respect of when the trustees are removed or when that individual has power to override them. That is clearly the purpose of such an appointment. To be neutral for a moment, if a chief executive is appointed to a charity and that person either has the practical power to override the trustees or the commission removes the trustees and leaves a gap before appointing new trustees, someone must have legal responsibility for the trust. Whether or not my assertion is correct that that person takes on that responsibility under law, he does so in practice. That cannot be gainsaid. It seems absolutely correct that we should make it clear that that person is an interim trustee or perhaps even the interim trustee.
I am worried about the practice of the appointment of interim mangers and trustees. Before I speak to the new clauses, I should say that amendments Nos. 106 to 111 are merely consequential on amendment No. 104. I am anxious about three aspects of the appointment of trustees or interim managers, each of which is neatly covered by my new clauses.
First, the charity trustees or corporation—if the charity is incorporated—must be notified in good time of the reasons for the appointment, otherwise it will be impossible for them to appeal against it. Apart from anything else, that is good practice, common sense and a courtesy. Furthermore, they will be unable take advantage of the tribunal if they do not know the reasons for the appointment. I suspect that unless that requirement to notify is placed in the Bill, or the commission makes an undertaking that it will always do so, there will be lots of appeals to the tribunal.

Edward Miliband: I am the bearer of good news. That has been placed in Bill following a debate in another place. Paragraph 108 of schedule 8 inserts a new section into the Charities Act 1993 to achieve precisely that purpose.

Andrew Turner: The sun has indeed got his hat on—hip, hip hooray.
New clause 4 deals with my second concern—the remuneration of trustees. My hon. Friend the Member for Worthing, West referred to appendix 2, which I think was circulated to all members of the Committee. It is headed “appendix 2”, but I am not clear on what it is an appendix to. However, it is the outcome of a list of appointments of receivers and managers over the period from 1993 to 2004. It runs to seven or eight pages and covers the appointment of 51 receivers and managers.
The problem is that such people have to be paid. A bigger problem is that they can be paid, and usually are, by the charity on the orders of the commission under the 1992 Act. When I list the first page of the companies that furnish those trustees, hon. Members will be able to imagine the sort of the sums that we are talking about. The list reads as follows: Coopers and Lybrand, Coopers and Lybrand, Arthur Andersen, Arthur Andersen, Coopers and Lybrand, KPMG—then there is one that I have never heard of—BDO Stoy Hayward and Coopers and Lybrand. That is just the first page. Those are big companies that cost a huge amount to retain, as the Government know because they do it all the time. When such companies are appointed to run small charities—or indeed large ones—they inevitably rack up huge bills.
Sadly, the freedom of information search found only about seven or eight examples in which the commission retained sufficient information to tell the researcher how much it had spent on the 51 receivers and managers. In one case the figure was £129,000 for six months, in another £87,000 for nine months, in another £393,000 for four months’ work—these are KPMG rates—and in a further case the figure was £72,000 for five months’ work. All those sums were paid for by the charity.
I accept that we cannot measure the work of a big company such as KPMG solely by the time that elapses between its appointment and its discharge. I am sure that in many cases such companies do not do much for part of the time and that they do not charge for those periods. However, those are huge sums to charge small charities. I am concerned to read that in at least one case—the Little Gidding Trust case—the commission refused to appoint a receiver and manager whenthe trustees requested that it do so, because the commission believed that the charity did not have liquid funds with which to pay the receiver and manager. That is not the Charity Commission working in the best interests of the charity. I propose therefore in new clause 4—this is fundamental—that the commission and not the charity should meet the regulatory cost.
New clause 5 emphasises that. I cannot see a single person in the list of 51 who is a volunteer. I shall let other Committee members into a secret, Mr. Gale, of which you might be aware: for many years, whenever there was a row in a Conservative association, the professional staff in the Conservative central office had to spend hours trying to sort it out. [Interruption.] Of course there were lots of rows, as I am sure there are in other parties as well. Recently, that has been changed. Professional staff in central office now spend their time campaigning or assisting people in campaigning—in some cases, not as effectively as we might like, but never mind; that also is true for all parties—while the senior volunteers spend their time trying to sort out the rows. I see no reason why the commission should be wedded to appointing hugely expensive international firms of consultants, for that is what they are.
Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab) indicated assent.

Andrew Turner: The hon. Lady nods. I hope that she will not mind my drawing attention to it. Such consultants are hired to sort out problems that could well be solved using the common sense of an experienced volunteer.

Roger Gale: I call the Minister.

Martin Horwood: On a point of order, Mr. Gale. I was advised earlier that we could speak more than once during debate on a clause.

Roger Gale: Order. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. It is customary, after the two Opposition Front-Bench spokesmen have spoken to their amendments, to hear from the Minister. If the hon. Gentleman wishes to contribute further before the Minister responds, he may do so.

Martin Horwood: I am extremely grateful for your indulgence, Mr. Gale. I apologise that I neglected to address new clause 9, which stands in my name and has been grouped with amendment No. 104.
New clause 9 is relevant to the remarks made by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight on new clause 4, because the two offer alternative approaches to the possibility that the cost of receivers and managers, interim managers, trustees or whatever they will end up being called will run out of control. I have a lot of sympathy with new clause 4, and the sums that the hon. Gentleman recited sound extremely high, but it is unreasonable simply to say that the Charity Commission should always bear the cost of sorting out the problems of a charity that has, legitimately or not, been put into such a situation.
The most alarming thing about the Association for Charities report, although I cannot find the page that gives chapter and verse, is that in some cases the original estimated cost of the receiver and manager, and therefore the basis on which the contract was awarded, was exceeded by a huge proportion—six or seven times, if I am right. In such circumstances, there is a legitimate reason for the commission to bear at least the cost of any surplus over what was originally intended.
New clause 9 would address the problem by saying that a proper public tender exercise must be conducted in line with best practice from the Office of Government Commerce, which I am sure is very good indeed. If a cost has been estimated to the receiver and manager, there would therefore be some onus on them to limit costs and a direct interest for the commission in restricting excessive costs among the receivers and managers that it appoints, because it will run the risk of bearing the costs if they are excessive.
Regrettably, I cannot support new clause 4, but I invite the hon. Member for Isle of Wight to support new clause 9. If the opportunity arises, I shall press it to a Division.

Roger Gale: The hon. Gentleman has indicated that he would like to force a Division on new clause 9 when the appropriate moment arrives, and the hon. Member for Isle of Wight indicated that he wished to press one of his amendments. If he does, he had better tell me now, or it will not be moved.

Andrew Turner: That was merely a way of finishing a speech, Mr. Gale. I apologise for misleading you.

Edward Miliband: The amendments are important, but I disagree with them. None the less, I hope to offer some words of reassurance.
Amendment Nos. 104 and 106 to 111 are all about the name “interim manager”. It is precisely because of the debate in another place that we have changed the name from “receiver and manager” to “interim manager”, because it was considered in that the name “receiver” would conjure up inappropriate images. Interim managers are appointed only after an inquiry has found misconduct or has found that property is at risk—appointment is not a trivial matter. Last year, there were only two cases of appointment of an interim manager among all the charities in Britain. Appointment of an interim manager is both a serious and an unusual occurrence.
I do not think that the name “interim trustee” would be appropriate. It is true that interim managers sometimes assume the whole of the trustee’s responsibilities, but on occasion they assume only part of those responsibilities. It would be incredibly confusing for there to be both an interim trustee—whom we propose to call the interim manager—and a group of trustees who would continue to fulfil some of their charitable functions. An interim manager might, for example, assume responsibility for the charity property, with operations remaining in the jurisdiction of the trustees. The solution proposed by the amendment was potentially ingenious, but it would lead to confusion.

Alun Michael: I understand the point that my hon. Friend makes, and it is a powerful one. The point of the amendment would be to clarify the function being undertaken. However, although it cannot be dealt with now, is there a case for a title such as “interim trustee” to be used when all the trustees’ functions are being taken over, rather than only part? That should not be decided on the hoof, but will my hon. Friend reflect on it?

Edward Miliband: I shall, but my first impression is that my right hon. Friend’s suggestion might lead to even further confusion. An interim trustee would be appointed if he were going to run the whole charity, whereas an interim manager would be appointed if only part of the charity were going to be run under his jurisdiction. I am not sure that that would convey the message that we want to convey, though I appreciate that the suggestion is an ingenious one.

Martin Horwood: Would the Minister be moved in his position by the opinion of counsel that was obtained by the Association for Charities? That concluded:
“For practical purposes, therefore, an R and M has the same powers as the trustees whom he displaces, whether the displacement is in whole or in part, albeit that he exercises them under the Commission’s supervision.”
Does the Minister therefore accept that the confusion already exists, or at least that legal differences of opinion already exist? The suggestion made by the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Alun Michael) has a lot to recommend it.

Edward Miliband: I do not agree. The legal opinion might be right, but that does not detract from the fact that trustees continue to fulfil part of the functions in the case of at least some interim manager appointments. To give the interim manager the name “interim trustee” would suggest that the trustees no longer had any powers over the organisation.

Martin Horwood: The evidence obtained by the Association for Charities under the freedom of information legislation suggests that that is exactly what is happening in the majority of cases—the existing trustees are excluded.

Edward Miliband: The question is not about the majority of cases—we are trying to deal with all cases. The question is whether the term “interim trustee” would be appropriate in all cases, and the problem is that it would not be appropriate. Where would that leave the original trustees who are continuing to carry out functions? It is all very well the hon. Gentleman saying that my right hon. Friend’s suggestion is correct—it is ingenuous—but I am not sure what it would achieve.
In the most serious cases, we would have an interim trustee appointed where all the powers were being taken over. In the cases seen as less serious, we would have an interim manager appointed with trustees continuing to exercise some functions. If the hon. Gentleman’s concern is that the notion of “interim manager” is an unfortunate term—because it suggests a gravity that he thinks is inappropriate—it does not meet his purpose to apply it to what might be seen as the less serious cases.
Several Hon. Membersrose—

Edward Miliband: I have a wealth of options before me, but let me carry on with the hon. Gentleman.

Martin Horwood: The suggestion of the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth is more ingenuous than he realises. In the less grave situations, charity trustees would still be in position. Therefore, the damaging impression would not necessarily be there. It is only in the case in which the charities are completely excluded that the greatest risk to public reputation is present.

Edward Miliband: I am not sure that I follow that point but let me give way to the hon. Member for Isle of Wight.

Andrew Turner: I think that the Minister is construing this amendment slightly too sharply because it actually refers to
“’(who will otherwise be known as an interim trustee as appropriate)’.”
In other words, if someone has responsibilities of trusteeship, he is known as an interim trustee. If he does not, he is not known as that. That was the intention of amendments Nos. 106 to 111.

Edward Miliband: I fear that we are beginning to dance on the head of a pin. I understand the point being made. My point is that that is an unusual case; it happened twice last year. Let us have one name covering the appointment of those individuals. To have different names for the same individual, albeit exercising powers that are slightly different in whole or in part, will add to the confusion that hon. Gentlemen say that they want to clear up.

Alun Michael: My hon. Friend is engaging precisely with the matters before us. I understand his wish not to make a change that might end up being more, and not less, confusing. He is right to attempt to achieve that. However, if there is a lack of clarity about what the responsibilities are in all cases and if there are two functions, one taking over the full trusteeship—[Interruption.]

Roger Gale: Order. If hon. Members wish to discuss matters with staff, they must do outside the Committee room.

Alun Michael: If an individual comes in under those powers and takes over all the responsibilities of trustees, that ought to be clear in common-sense language to people outside. If that individual is taking over only a specific area, such as protection of property, that also ought to be clear because the trustees are still in place. I suggest to my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary that he may be right—that defending what is in the Bill is the right course to take. However, it would be sensible to reflect on the available options and try to achieve terminology that is clear to the general public.

Edward Miliband: One thing that will add to the confusion is that the trustees always remain in office even if their functions are given to the interim manager. However, I will reflect on what my right hon. Friend says.
I do not think that there is an issue that needs to be cleared up because the substantive issues about interim managers are not really about the name, but about the costs, as raised by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight. They are about the ability to review both their appointment and continuing appointment, as raised earlier—very passionately—by the hon. Member for Cheltenham. I want to deal with that briefly, and I hope that that will provide some reassurance.
Earlier in our deliberations, the hon. Member for Cheltenham engaged in a protracted discussion with me about the extent to which the appointment of the interim manager and that person’s continuing presence in office was reviewable. I undertook to come back to him with the Charity Commission’s guidelines on how often it reviews the continued appointment of the interim manager and how often that decision can be reviewed. I can tell the hon. Gentleman that new, internal guidelines are being prepared and they will be implemented by the commission in the coming months. That will ensure that there is a gap of not more than two months in the process of reviewing the appointment of interim managers and, on each occasion, those decisions will be appealable to the charity tribunal. I know that he was worried about ensuring that there was proper scrutiny of the continuing presence in office of an interim manager and I hope that he will be reassured by what I have said.
I hope that I have answered the point about new clause 3 in my intervention on the hon. Member for Isle of Wight. Indeed, he concluded that the sun was shining as a result of it. New clause 4 is about who pays for the interim manager. I am sympathetic to the hon. Gentleman’s argument about the costs and nature of interim managers, and the impact that that could have. I reiterate that it is an unusual occurrence, but that is not to say that the costs that he described are large. Big sums are often at risk and liabilities are potentially incurred by an individual, as part of a corporate body, going in to sort out an organisation. Such people would need proper insurance to cover them, which partly explains why large, professional bodies tend to be involved.

Robert Flello: Will my hon. Friend note the wider issue in respect of receiver’s fees? They have been extremely high in simple cases that are not associated with charities.

Edward Miliband: That is an important point that should be noted by the Committee.
In partial reassurance to the hon. Member for Isle of Wight, the hon. Member for Cheltenham explained why it is right in most cases for the charity concerned to bear the cost of the appointment of an interim manager. The commission can, however, in exceptional cases—it has done so recently—agree to pay the costs itself. As for new clause 5, it is already the case that receivers and managers may work for nothing. It is just that none of them chooses to do so. I hope that I have reassured the hon. Gentleman about that.
There are two aspects to new clause 9 tabled by the hon. Member for Cheltenham, the first of which is a sum being agreed in advance and who should meet the additional costs. There is a real danger in a public tender exercise. At present, the commission appoints from a panel, but a widely publicised public tender exercise would do more reputational damage to a charity than the current system of appointing from a panel.

Andrew Turner: I am sure that the Parliamentary Secretary is aware that the panel is sometimes appointed by public tender. That does not involve naming each individual charity that it might be called on to serve in the future. Is that the practice?

Edward Miliband: That may be right. I will happily look at the matter but I am not convinced that there is not a perfectly good system in place at the moment. I undertake to talk to the commission about how it chooses its panel and whether, tying together the comments of the two hon. Gentlemen, there is a sufficiently wide range of candidates that can come forward.
On the second part of the amendment, for the same reasons that the hon. Member for Cheltenham answered the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight about the costs being borne by the charity concerned, it would be difficult to say in advance before one has gone into the organisation to work out the full extent of its problems and difficulties that a certain sum must be the limit of how much the interim manager is paid. I take the points about cost control that have been made across all sides, and I will go back to the commission from the debate and I am sure that it will be listening and reading the transcript of our proceedings and hearing the Committee’s concern, but it is not practical to decide in advance how much those costs would be and essentially make the commission bear any additional cost. With that explanation I hope that I have satisfied the Committee.

Martin Horwood: I am reassured by some of the Minister’s statements and certainly by his intention to go back and talk to the commission. He mentioned both the role of receivers and managers and possibly considering the suggestion by the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth; to look at the excessive costs being run up on occasion by people in the position of receiver and manager and in future of interim manager or trustee, as we decide.
I think that he is being slightly optimistic, however. First, he said that this happens only once or twice a year. If that is true in the past 12 months, that is atypical, because as I mentioned earlier, the Association for Charities obtained the total list of appointments between 1993 and 2004 and in some years five or six such appointments were made. It is sometimes much more common than he suggests in his remarks.
It is a matter of legitimate concern among charities, particularly among smaller charities that are growing and developing and are possibly subject to scrutiny because some of the practices that they may have indulged in may not conform always to best practice. It might be a legitimate concern for the Charity Commission that in practice the appointment of the receiver and manager can end up doing more harm than good, and on occasion lead to the closing down of the independent charity.
While I take the Minister at his word on his good intentions to talk to the commission, I am still minded to press new clause 9 in particular to a vote to ensure that there is a clear incentive for both the appointed receivers and managers and for the commission to minimise those excessive costs.

Peter Bottomley: I think that the hon. Gentleman has picked the right new clause to press if he is going to press one, but we all recognise that the Charity Commission is not part of the debate while it might agree with one or two of the things that the association has said; for example, in one case the receiver manager found poor financial controls and record keeping, inability of trustees to work together, inadequate charitable activity, the absence of a definitive membership list, which had apparently been remedied, and the unconstitutionality of some trustee appointments. I think that people who were complaining about the Charity Commission accept the criticism that the charities were broadly just. He has picked the right new clause.

Martin Horwood: I am grateful for that generous intervention by the hon. Member for Worthing, West. He makes a legitimate point that we are not here to challenge the concept of appointing something equivalent to a receiver and manager or an interim manager in principle. Obviously in many cases that will be necessary and as I said in many of the cases presented by the Association for Charities the case is certainly arguable and I can see the argument on both sides.
However, as he suggested I am going to press new clause 9 to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw amendment No. 104.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: No. 61, in schedule 8, page 149, line 16, at end insert—
‘(za) for “they have” substitute “it has”,’.—[Edward Miliband.]

Andrew Turner: I beg to move amendment No. 51, in schedule 8, page 155, line 6, after ‘charity’, insert
‘but so that the requirements of such regulations shall be the minimum commensurate with the need to ensure that the statement of accounts provides a true and fair view of the charity’s financial position’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 52, in schedule 8, page 155, line 7, after ‘made,’, insert ‘or—
(c) for more than one type of statement to be prepared to reflect the differing natures and sizes of different charities,’.
Government amendment No. 62

Andrew Turner: These are simple amendments. Amendment No. 52 would require that those setting regulations for charities’ accounts be able to prescribe more than one statement
“to reflect the differing natures and sizes of different charities.”
Amendment No. 51 would provide that
“the requirements...be the minimum commensurate with the need to ensure that the statement of accounts provides a true and fair view of the charity’s financial position”.
Again, that is designed to put SORP into context, which at present it appears not to be, and to reflect more clearly the capacity of different charities to do things differently.
Some charities—I wish this were in the UK—of the character of the Bill Gates Foundation, but not of its size, need do no fundraising at all. All they do is disburse moneys. There is no need for them therefore to have the same accounting requirements as, say, a large charity that depends a great deal on fundraising.

Martin Horwood: I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s comments on the matter, but I am slightly confused. It seems to me that the advantage of SORP is its universality. Even if the declared fundraising costs are nil, there is a huge virtue in everyone following the same standard. However, in the interests of work-life balance and the time of day, I shall restrict my comments to that.

Peter Bottomley: A friend of mine essentially leads the trusteeship of a significant charity, and was amazed when approached by someone from the Charity Commission and asked, “Why aren’t you trying to raise more money?” She replied with the point that my hon. Friend made, “Actually, the job of our trusteeship is to spend the money that it has got, and is perfectly adequate for the purposes for which it was established. We do not want to be told to raise money, if we decide that we do not need to”. A degree of sensitivity would be worthwhile. I am sure that the Charity Commission is capable of distinguishing between charities that raise money and those that do not. It should not be telling people which of the two they should be doing.

Edward Miliband: First, let me deal with my amendment in this group. Essentially, it is a minor amendment consequent on the conversion from “Commissioners” to “Commission”.
I am afraid that the hon. Member for Isle ofWight gets no stars for his two amendments, uncharacteristically. Amendment No. 52 is unnecessary because section 86 of the 1993 Act, which applies to all regulation under this Bill, allows already for the Secretary of State to make provision for different cases. Indeed, current regulations do exactly that.
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s intention behind amendment No. 51, but I do not think that it is fit for purpose—to use the current parlance—because it would be placed in a paragraph dealing specifically with requirements on settlor trusts. I am sure that it is not his intention, but the amendment would essentially introduce a new “true and fair” yardstick for settlor trusts and their statements of accounts. That would introduce SORP into a part of the law applicable only to settlor trusts, and a whole new raft of accounting standards for settlor trusts, which I am sure is not the deregulatory intent for which he wishes to be famous.
The other thing about it is that paradoxically, it would introduce new requirements relating to settler trusts but would also, by using the phrase “minimum commensurate”, relax the obligations. It would not require settler trusts to comply with more general regulations relevant to all charities—for example, by disclosing the salaries of a charity’s highest paid employees.
I am afraid that this is comprehensively a no-stars amendment. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw it.

Andrew Turner: That is the sort of mark that I would have given it as well. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: No. 62, in schedule 8, page 156, leave out lines 39 and 40 and insert—
‘(c) for “the Commissioners so request, be transmitted to them” substitute “the Commission so requests, be transmitted to it”, and’.
No. 63, in schedule 8, page 158, line 9, at end insert ‘, and
(c) for “they may” substitute “it may”.’.
No. 64, in schedule 8, page 164, line 41, at end insert—
‘(2A) Omit—
(a) in the definition of “exempt charity” in subsection (1), the words “(subject to section 24(8) above)”, and
(b) subsection (4).’.
No. 184, in schedule 8, page 165, line 7, at end insert—
‘(ba) in the definition of “institution”, after ““institution” insert “means an institution whether incorporated or not, and”.’.
No. 196, in schedule 8, page 165, line 15, at end insert—
‘169A In section 100(3) (extent) for “Section 10” substitute “Sections 10 to 10C”.’.
No. 185, in schedule 8, page 169, line 32, at end insert—

‘Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4)

In Part 3 of Schedule 14 to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (the Judicial Appointments Commission: relevant offices etc.) after the entries relating to section 6(5) of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992 insert—
“President of the Charity Tribunal
Paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 1B to the Charities Act 1993 (c. 10)”.’.
Legal member of the Charity Tribunal
Ordinary member of the Charity Tribunal
No. 186, in schedule 8, page 169, line 32, at end insert—

‘Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005 (asp 10)

The Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005 has effect subject to the following amendments.
In section 36(1) (powers of OSCR in relation to English and Welsh charities)—
(a) for “Charity Commissioners for England and Wales inform” substitute “Charity Commission for England and Wales informs”,
(b) for “under section 3” substitute “in accordance with section 3A”, and
(c) for “section 3(5) of that Act,” substitute “subsection (2) of that section,”.
In section 69(2)(d)(i) (persons disqualified from being charity trustees)—
(a) at the beginning insert “by the Charity Commission for England and Wales under section 18(2)(i) of the Charities Act 1993 or”, and
(b) for “under section 18(2)(i) of the Charities Act 1993 (c. 10),” substitute “, whether under section 18(2)(i) of that Act or under”.’.
No. 187, in schedule 8, page 169, line 32, at end insert—

‘Equality Act 2006 (c. 3)

(1) The Equality Act 2006 has effect subject to the following amendments.
(2) In section 58(2) (charities relating to religion or belief)—
(a) for “Charity Commissioners for England and Wales” substitute “Charity Commission”, and
(b) for “the Commissioners” substitute “the Commission”.
(3) In section 79(1)(a) (interpretation) after “given by” insert “section 1(1) of”.’.—[Edward Miliband.]

Schedule 8, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 9

Repeals And Revocation

Amendments made: No. 188, in schedule 9, page 170, line 5, at beginning insert—
‘Police, Factories, &c. (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1916 (c. 31)
In section 5(1), in paragraph (b) of the proviso, the words from “, and no representation” onwards.’.
No. 189, in schedule 9, page 170, line 18, column 2, at end insert—
‘In section 79, in subsection (6) the words “(subject to subsection (7))”, and subsection (7).’.
No. 190, in schedule 9, page 170, line 20, column 2, at end insert—
‘In Schedule 7, the entry relating to the Police, Factories, &c. (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1916 (c. 31).’.
No. 197, in schedule 9, page 170, leave out line 29.—[Edward Miliband.]

Question proposed, That schedule 9, as amended, be the Ninth schedule to the Bill.

Peter Bottomley: I shall not go through what was in schedule 9 before it was amended, but the Minister will notice that there are references to the Charities Acts 1992 and 1993, among others. Does he have any information to give the Committee about when the Charities Act will be consolidated? When he read from the Charities Act, he was reading from a text that had a commentary to go with it because of the number of amendments.
It would be helpful to know whether the Government plan to make the Charities Act accessible to others. Various other provisions, such as the Regulatory Reform (National Health Service Charitable and Non-Charitable Trust Accounts and Audit) Order 2005, are involved as well, but the key point is the Charities Act itself. After the Bill becomes an Act, one of the first things that the Government ought to do is to consolidate it so that it is accessible to those who are not necessarily lawyers with textbooks.

Edward Miliband: I agree. It is an urgent task for us. After the Bill completes its passage, we hope to proceed as soon as possible.

Schedule 9, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 10

Transitional provisions and savings

Amendments made: No. 198, in schedule 10, page 174, line 4, at end insert—

‘Section (Disclosure of information to and by Northern Ireland regulator): Disclosure of information to and by Northern Ireland regulator

15A In relation to an offence committed in England and Wales before the commencement of section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) (general limit on magistrates’ courts power to impose imprisonment), the reference to 12 months in section (Disclosure of information to and by Northern Ireland regulator)(6) is to be read as a reference to 6 months.’.
No. 199, in schedule 10, page 174, line 20, at end insert—
‘18A In relation to an offence committed in England and Wales before the commencement of section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) (general limit on magistrates’ courts power to impose imprisonment), the reference to 12 months in section 10A(4) of the 1993 Act (as inserted by paragraph 99 of Schedule 8 to this Act) is to be read as a reference to 6 months.’.—[Edward Miliband.]

Schedule 10, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 75 and 76 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 77

Commencement

Amendment made: No. 193, in clause 77, page 80, line 17, at end insert ‘and
(f) paragraph 99 of Schedule 8 so far as it confers power to make regulations, and section 74(1) so far as relating to that paragraph.’.—[Edward Miliband.]

Clause 77, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 78

Short title and extent

Amendments made: No. 177, in clause 78, page 80, line 34, after ‘to’ insert—
‘(a) ’.
No. 178, in clause 78, page 80, line 35, after ‘(c. 6),’ insert ‘or
(b) those made by Schedule 8 in the Police, Factories, &c. (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1916 (c. 31), or
(c) the repeal made in that Act by Schedule 9,’.—[Edward Miliband.]

Edward Miliband: I beg to move amendmentNo. 179, in clause 78, page 80, line 39, leave out subsection (8).
The amendment will remove the privilege amendment made in another place, taking account of the fact that the other place cannot legislate on public expenditure.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 78, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 1

Duties of trustees
‘(1) A charity trustee must, in exercising functions in that capacity, act in the interests of the charity and must, in particular—
(a) seek, in good faith, to ensure that the charity acts in a manner which is consistent with its purposes;
(b) act with the care and diligence that it is reasonable to expect of a person who is managing the affairs of another person; and
(c) in circumstances capable of giving rise to a conflict of interest between the charity and any person responsible for the appointment or remuneration of the charity trustee—
(i) put the interests of the charity before those of the other person, or
(ii) where any other duty prevents the charity trustee from doing so, disclose the conflicting interest to the charity and refrain from participating in any deliberation or decision of the other charity trustees with respect to the matter in question.
(2) The charity trustees of a charity must ensure that the charity complies with any direction, requirement, notice or duty imposed on it by virtue of this Act.
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) are without prejudice to any other duty imposed by enactment or otherwise on a charity trustee in relation to the exercise of functions in that capacity.
(4) Any breach of the duties under subsections (1) or (2) is to be treated as being misconduct in the administration of the charity.
(5) All charity trustees must take such steps as are reasonably practicable for the purposes of ensuring—
(a) that any breach of a duty under subsections (1) or (2) is corrected by the trustee concerned and not repeated; and
(b) that any trustee who has been in serious or persistent breach of either or both of those duties is removed as a trustee.
(6) For the purposes of this section “charity trustee” includes an individual representative of a corporate trustee.’.—[Mr. Turner.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Andrew Turner: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This is an attempt to set out the responsibilities and duties of trustees in a single clause. I am sure that the Minister will tell us that they appear elsewhere in the legislation, or they might appear spread out over lots of different parts of the legislation. It may be that in the consolidation to which my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing, West referred a moment ago, those duties and responsibilities will be clarified and brought together. The new clause is probing rather than one that I expect to press to a vote.

Edward Miliband: I sympathise with the sentiments behind the clause. The Trustee Act 2000 covers unincorporated charities, and the Companies Act 1985 and the Company Law Reform Bill currently being debated elsewhere in the House cover incorporated charities, giving them very similar responsibilities. It is important to clarify the duties of trustees, so it is worth saying that the Charity Commission has produced a popular and well respected booklet called “The Essential Trustee: What you need to know”, which covers the responsibilities and duties of trustees. The hon. Gentleman raises an important issue and the main things to say is that it is set out clearly in documents available to trustees. I hope that he will withdraw the new clause.

Peter Bottomley: May I follow the Minister by saying that his words about the booklet “The Essential Trustee” will be warmly endorsed across the House? The Charity Commission, which produced it, has done a service to trustees, and those who have presented it have put it in an accessible form. They give a brief introduction and then expand on what people need to know. It is one of the examples of the Charity Commission doing its job well and allowing trustees to do theirs better.

Andrew Turner: I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 6

Disqualification for acting as a charity trustee

Brought up, and read the First time.

James Duddridge: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is a pleasure as always, Mr. Gale, to serve under your chairmanship. I wish to be brief but I shall touch on the matter, which I raised on Second Reading, of people with learning disabilities being unable to serve as trustees. I have had an awful lot of conflicting advice, despite the reassurances on Second Reading that such people could stand. One of my researchers phoned the Charity Commission yesterday and explained the problem, and the Charity Commission said, “Yes, absolutely, people with disabilities can stand as trustees.” My researcher asked, “People with learning disabilities?” and the reply was, “No, definitely not.” The commission then said that maybe they could. We need more clarity.
The matter seems to hang on the words:
“A trustee shall cease to hold office if he or she becomes incapable by reason of mental disorder, illness or injury of managing his own affairs.”
That is quite an old-fashioned, paternalistic and pejorative view of people with disabilities. Even if he cannot support the new clause, it would be good if the Minister could find some way to support the underlying principle.

Martin Horwood: Briefly, I wish to commend the spirit of the new clause. I reassure the hon. Member for Rochford and Southend, East, that even under current charity law there is latitude for trustees to be appointed in such circumstances. My own experience of the Alzheimer’s Society, which deals not only with Alzheimer’s disease but with other forms of dementia, included the moment when the first person with dementia was appointed as a trustee. His business experience, intelligence and different perspective on the running of the charity was incredibly valuable and he was a very effective trustee. The nature of his dementia did not preclude him from involvement in any of the charity’s decision making. I am not sure that the hon. Gentleman’s fears are well founded, but I commend to the Minister the spirit of the new clause.

Edward Miliband: We all owe a debt to the hon. Member for Rochford and Southend, East for raising the issue. I have a few things to say on it.
On Second Reading, the hon. Gentleman said that his worry was prompted by the situation of the SHIELDS—supporting, helping, informing everyone with learning disabilities in Southend—parliament, an advocacy organisation of which he is a trustee. Mandy Smedley, the administrator of the SHIELDS parliament received advice from the commission that people with learning difficulties cannot be charity trustees. The commission looked into that and has confirmed that the advice given through its telephone help line was incorrect. It will be writing to her to apologise and to confirm the legal position.
I have discussed the matter raised by the hon. Gentleman with representatives of the commission since Second Reading. The commission needs to be more aware of the issue in the future and must ensure that proper guidance is given. To that end, I hope that several things happen, the first of which is that the commission will write to the hon. Gentleman and set out the position more clearly. Secondly, it will consider updating the document “Users on Board”, which is about users of charities becoming trustees, to make it absolutely clear that people with learning disabilities are not excluded from being trustees, but, indeed, encouraged to be trustees as part of its commitment to diversity. It will also look at updating other documents, including “Finding New Trustees”, to take account of such issues. The latter document will not be updated so quickly, but the commission will be making quick progress to update “Users on Board”.

James Duddridge: Specifically with the “Users on Board” document, will the Parliamentary Secretary consider the duties of existing trustees when appointing other trustees? At present, it says that it is unfair to impose on someone a range of duties that a person cannot properly understand or does not want to carry out. That general guidance to existing trustees caused some confusion, too.

Edward Miliband: I shall definitely look into that.

Tom Levitt: With all due respect to the hon. Member for Rochford and Southend, East, who is doing the Committee a service by raising the matter, he has confused learning disability with the incapacity to make decisions on one’s own rights. There is a huge difference in those two definitions. While there may be a grey area in between them, we must not assume that those with learning difficulties are not capable of making decisions in their own right. Will my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary comment on a situation in which an existing trustee had a stroke and a power of attorney is appointed? Would the person who acts as power of attorney be able to act for the trustee under such circumstances?

Edward Miliband: As I understand it, that person would be able to do that.

James Duddridge: Perhaps the Parliamentary Secretary will agree that I was reflecting on the confusion in the documentation between someone with a learning disability and not being able to make a decision. I was not suggesting anything untoward.

Edward Miliband: I agree with the hon. Gentleman. The sins are mainly those of omission in the Charity Commission’s documents rather than it saying the wrong thing. The omission has obviously caused confusion even to some commission staff, but action will be taken to ensure that the document is corrected. We should all be grateful to him for raising such an important issue.

James Duddridge: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 7

Loss of charitable status
‘Where charitable status is withdrawn from any organisation or institution the assets of that charity must be deployed or protected for the charitable purpose for which they were originally constituted with regard to—
(a) the continuity of that purpose;
(b) the need to maintain public confidence in that purpose; and
(c) the interests of beneficiaries.’.—[Martin Horwood.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Martin Horwood: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The purpose behind the new clause is to deal with what might be a slight gap in charity law—[Interruption.] The Minister is already nodding his head vigorously. Sorry, I meant that he is shaking his head vigorously. The new clause was the result of discussions with a learned and noble Friend who had debated the Charity Bill at length in another place. When discussing the public benefit test, he had realised the possible implications of the loss of charitable status. The assumption of many people would be that an institution that lost its charitable status for whatever reason would simply carry on in a non-charitable form. However, that would not be the case because the assets that it had employed as a charity were given for a charitable purpose and must in law be applied to a charitable purpose. They would not be available to the non-charitable institution. In the case of fixed assets, such as a significant building, that would be a major issue.
The purpose behind the amendment is to clarify what is already the intent—and is certainly the commission’s intent—to avoid the loss of charitable status, that continuity and the interests of the beneficiary were ideal and that every step should be taken to avoid this happening.
In the event of loss of charitable status happening, the clause makes clear that the desirable outcome is not the collapse of the institution and the redeployment of its assets to another charitable purpose, whether cy-prÃ(c)s or not, but the continuity of the institution—its name, public reputation and the interests of its beneficiaries.
Those responsible for the charitable assets would have a duty to try and recreate the charity within the terms of charity law and passing whatever public benefit test or whatever other reason it was that they had failed in their charitable status in the first place. My noble and learned Friend was convinced that this is a gap in charity law. However, if the Minister can reassure me, I would happily withdraw the new clause.

Peter Bottomley: If I understand the new clause and the explanation that the hon. Gentleman has given—he has made a fair speech—I do not agree with his intent. If an organisation has been a charity and has been held to have a charitable purpose, because of this change of law—which frankly, I do not think is necessary; I prefer to assume that both education and religion are charitable, but that is not the situation that we are in—it is perfectly possible that an organisation that has operated as a charity with excepted charitable purposes for decades or even hundreds of years may find itself ruled not to be charitable.
One circumstance, which the new clause is aimed at, is for the trustees to accept it as a modern charity. The alternative is to say that is not why we exist, we want to go on doing what we have been doing for decades or centuries, even though we are now to be modernised and told we are not a charity. In those circumstances, it is not right that all their assets—their name, property and endowments—should be taken from them and given to something that is still excepted as a charity.

Martin Horwood: I hesitate to intervene on the hon. Gentleman and ask him about something about which he may be wrong. Once the assets have been given for a charitable purpose, they must be applied to that charitable purpose. If that institution ceases to be charitable, it cannot use them under any circumstances.

Peter Bottomley: That is one of the reasons whyI might do a disservice; I know that I have a communication problem. I need to go on and attempt to perfect what I am trying to say.
Let us suppose that donor Bottomley in the 1660s had said, “I want my money to establish an institution for purposes that are acceptably charitable in the 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th centuries.” There is a tradition of what the purpose is and it is accepted. Yet because of this change of law—we are changing the law and potentially redrawing the boundaries of what is charitable—Bottomley’s donation should be allowed to continue for the purpose for which it is given. The fact that it is charitable is a secondary factor. I argue that, in those circumstances, it should be allowed for the present trustees to meet the purpose for which the trust was established. That is the problem. I contend that it contradicts what the hon. Member has put forward in his new clause. At some stage it would be useful to hear other people’s views on that.
If I can make my point more clearly, I do not want to get involved in the independent school issue. I do not want to try to imagine the circumstances in which the Chancellor might so take against an Oxford college, which is going to have some kind of regulation or is part of the exemption that we have dealt with already—so I should not go into that too far—that he wants to say, “I am going to try to get the Charity Commission to say that the charitable purpose is not sufficient”. If there were then a review, and it decided that the public benefit was not great enough, and so the college’s charitable status was lost, what would happen to it?
Would the college be told that all the fellows who are the society, who are the trustees, are going to be displaced and the Chancellor’s friends from some other university are going to be brought in? Or would there be an advertisement and a public appointments commission, with head-hunters being brought in, to decide, once a society had been created, who should be the research fellows and what tenure each of them should have—all because the charitable purpose has been redefined? It strikes me that the hon. Gentleman needs a bit of help on this.

Martin Horwood: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I may have underestimated the power and intellect behind his argument, because he is right. The weakness in my new clause is that it says that where charitable status is withdrawn from any organisation or institution
“assets...must be deployed or protected for the charitable purpose”,
but it does not specify whether those assets are charitable under the new law. If they are considered to be charitable—if they were given for an obviously beneficial, philanthropic purpose that qualifies as charitable even under the new public benefit test—what I was saying does apply and those assets would have to be deployed for a charitable purpose and could not be carried forward to the new, now non-charitable organisation. However, if those assets had been charitable, but are not now charitable because, as the hon. Gentleman said, they were given for a purpose that was deemed to be charitable in the 17th century but is not deemed to be so under the new 21st century law, there is a problem, which he has correctly identified, and I share his sentiment.

Peter Bottomley: Perhaps there is a better way of putting it. Will the Minister reflect in the next few months on whether, in the rare circumstances in which a charity cannot maintain its charitable status, which will not be common unless a coach and horses is driven through independent education, and when it is clear what the donor—the person who settled the trust—intended and there is a conflict between that intention and the new circumstances that have come about because of this legislation, there can be some way of settling whether the purposes must be changed to remain charitable, or whether the purposes can be maintained and the assets used? If the Minister is adamant, Report is going to be rather more interesting than it would otherwise be. What I am really trying to say is that I do not support the hon. Gentleman’s new clause, assuming that I have properly understood it.

Edward Miliband: I thank the whole Committee for this interesting debate. Let me start with the legal base, which is really the subject of the amendment, although it clearly goes much wider than that. I can provide the whole Committee with an explanation by quoting from the little-known Charity Commission document, “Maintenance of an Accurate Register of Charities”. At paragraph 31, it says:
“In law, assets held on a charitable trust are irrevocably dedicated to charitable purposes. So, if trustees are unable or unwilling themselves to arrange for changes to their charity’s objects so that these are exclusively charitable, then they must apply to us to make a cy-prÃ¨s scheme directing that the assets held on trust are used for other charitable purposes as near as possible to the original purposes of the institution. We can help trustees in making such an application.”
The basis for that is in common law.
It is worth pointing out that it is wrong to say that charitable status is “withdrawn” from an organisation. That is the word that the hon. Gentleman uses in his amendment. It is a bit of a logic-chopping point, but charitable status is not like a licence that can be granted and withdrawn. An organisation is either inherently a charity or not, depending on whether the purposes for which it exists are charitable and whether it is for the public benefit. In registering a charity, the commission is not granting charitable status to an organisation, but recognising that it is inherently charitable, having legally assessed its purposes and the public benefit.

Martin Horwood: I am grateful to the Minister. I agree with his interpretation; perhaps the use of the word “withdrawn” was unwise drafting. Nevertheless, as the hon. Member for Worthing, West has observed, we are in the process of changing the law, and it is possible that an institution that was charitable may no longer be so. It might be that charitable status is lost, rather than withdrawn. None the less, charitable status could be held to have been lost—the change is possible.

Edward Miliband: It is difficult to understand, but loss of charitable status is already possible—the public benefit test exists now. That takes me on to something that I was going to say about what happens when an organisation is deemed not to be compliant with the charitable purpose and public benefit requirements, which addresses the point made by the hon. Member for Worthing, West. In that case, action must be taken to get the institution back into charitable status, and that is possible in most cases. It is not usually inherently impossible for the institution to move back into charitable status. In the few cases in which that cannot be done, the assets must be dealt with by some form of cy-prÃ¨s variation of the charitable purposes, but that is the already the situation now.
The hon. Gentleman asked was why it is not possible for the institution simply to carry on, not as a charity, but essentially pursuing the same purposes. There are two problems with that. First, it is not fair to the people who gave money, property or whatever to the charity in the first place, who did it on the basis that the institution was a charity that met charitable purposes and provided public benefit. Secondly, loss of charitable status removes not only some tax privileges, but a degree of regulation so that the assets of the charity could then quite easily be disbursed for private profit, because charity law would no longer apply and there would be no regulator for the institution. The wording of the new clause proposed by the hon. Member for Cheltenham is admirable, as are the underlying sentiments, but no organisation would exist to regulate the institution, because the institution would no longer be covered by charity law.
I agree with the hon. Member for Worthing, West that the issue is tricky. The reassurance that I offer to him is that the Charity Commission will in all circumstances endeavour to enable institutions to move back to charitable status if public benefit is no longer met. That must be the Charity Commission’s priority. Only in the most extreme cases in which, dare I say, there is stubbornness or refusal to co-operate would other, more drastic measures be considered.

Peter Bottomley: I know that the Minister’s words are intended to be helpful. It is clear that there should not be an easy way for charity trustees to turn their charity into something non-compliant and non-recognised, otherwise they would be able to just walk away with the assets. That is easily accepted. I suspect that the examples that I have in mind would be rare and difficult to achieve, and I am sure that trustees would in most cases wish to remain compliant. I am sure that if there were a question mark over recognition they would do their best.
Let me cite an odd example, which is not intended to be taken too seriously. The former Member of Parliament for Cambridge University, Henry Lucas, established two trusts. One was a hospital for the elderly in Berkshire, of which I was once a trustee. The other, of which I was not a trustee, established the Lucasian chair of mathematics in Cambridge, which has been held by Isaac Barrow and Isaac Newton and is now held by Stephen Hawking. Were it to be judged that higher mathematics had no public benefit—this is where the exaggeration comes in—it would be perfectly possible for the trustees to be told by the Charity Commission, “You are in danger of ceasing to be recognised so you should switch to something else such as nursing, so that the Lucasian chair of mathematics becomes the Lucasian chair of nursing.” The trustees would respond, “Henry Lucas said that he wanted mathematics. There is a tradition of mathematics and a chair of mathematics it should remain.” I know that that is improbable, but it is the sort of issue that I have in mind. I hope that the Minister will think about that and accept that there is something in what I am saying: that there would need to be an adjudicating authority. It is not easy, but I think that there is a serious problem.

Roger Gale: The hon. Gentleman is in danger of winning the award for the longest intervention in any Committee.

Edward Miliband: In the hon. Gentleman’s defence, I think that he presumed that I had finished.
The hon. Gentleman’s point is interesting. The answer is that one cannot possibly imagine the circumstances in which the Charity Commission would say that an organisation established for a chair of mathematics should change to a chair of nursing. As earlier discussions showed, the whole point about cy-prÃ¨s is that if the old purposes are either not for the public benefit or cannot be carried out, the new purposes must be as close as possible to the original intent of the gift. I do not think that anyone can suggest that the gift in that case was intended for a chair of nursing.
I am happy for that discussion to continue outside the Committee. Hon. Members must admit that I have been very flexible so far, but on that matter I am inclined to be inflexible. The Committee holds the nature of charity law in trust and I am being invited down a dangerous road whereby an organisation that did not meet the public benefit test could simply say, “Well, in that case we will go outside charity law.” I know that that is not what the hon. Member for Cheltenham was suggesting, but that would betray the history of the organisation and the nature of charitable law. So I am going to be intransigent, but as always we shall listen to representations.

Martin Horwood: I am disappointed that the Minister is inclined to move from generosity to intransigence at this stage in the Committee’s deliberations.
May I offer an alternative example to the one offered by the hon. Member for Worthing, West? The Joseph Rowntree trusts were established for a number of purposes, some of which were specifically charitable and designed to fall within the charitable remit. However, one of them—I cannot remember which one because the names are very similar—was designed specifically to fall outside charity law, yet under the new heads of charity, it might well qualify as charitable. It is equally possible that under a different Administration the law will change again, causing it to lose that charitable status. As we change legislation, it is eminently possible that organisations that were charitable—[Interruption.] The Minister is shaking his head. Perhaps he could explain the error in my argument.

Edward Miliband: This will be a legal one-way street. The hon. Gentleman is right that an organisation that was not set up for charitable purposes could become charitable if conventions of the time change. However, once an organisation starts to benefit from charitable status, it should not be able to take those benefits outside charity law. That is why it is a one-way street.

Martin Horwood: That was not really the point that I was making. An institution’s charitable status might change, by virtue not of its changing its activities, but of a change in the law. I was simply supporting the point made by the hon. Member for Worthing, West.
The Minister was right in describing the ideal process, which is that the loss of charitable status should be the last resort and that everything should be done by the Charity Commission to avoid that happening. It would require a succession of intransigent trustees to make it happen. However, it will be possible, as it is now, to lose charitable status. As we change the basis of charitable status, that is slightly more possible than it has been in the past.
The question is what happens to the assets of the charity in that event. The Minister talked about assets falling outside charity law. My new clause does not address that. It specifically states that
“the assets...must be deployed or protected for the charitable purpose for which they were originally constituted”,
so I am addressing what happens to charitable assets that must still be applied for charitable purposes. I have tried to frame a new clause that would explicitly direct those responsible away from the cy-prÃ¨s route towards the reconstitution of the charitable institution or the charitable purposes as originally constituted.
The hon. Member for Worthing, West has identified a parallel and equal problem with assets that might have been given first for the purpose of the institution and only secondly as charitable assets and therefore might well be considered not charitable under a change in the law. There is also a lack of clarity about what might happen to those assets, as the Minister, too, has shown.

Peter Bottomley: First, just to fill a gap, I should say that it was the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust that the hon. Gentleman referred to. Secondly, does he believe that the Minister should reflect on the fact that it would be open to the Government to change the law, whether through Parliament or under one of the provisions that we discussed earlier, so that various bodies that were not charities—this is a separate point from the one that I made before—could have charitable status? There would be a responsibility on the trustees to apply for it and then, if the Government changed the law again or the Charity Commission changed the way in which it thought of things, they would be caught and stuck.

Martin Horwood: The hon. Gentleman makes more elegantly the point that I was struggling to make that charitable status can change and what happens to assets in the event of loss of charitable status is a serious issue. The hon. Gentleman and the Minister have pointed out technical problems with the drafting of my new clause, so I am content to withdraw the motion, but I hope that the debate has shown that there is a serious issue that the Minister might care to reflect on further. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Roger Gale: Order. Given that the Committee is making admirable progress, this is an appropriate moment to remind the Committee that in its programme motion of Tuesday 4 July it said that the proceedings shall, so far as not previously concluded, be brought to a conclusion at 4 pm on Thursday 13 July. I am trying to hold the Committee to its own admonition. That will be achieved only if speeches are relatively brief.

New Clause 8

The Charity Independent Complaints Reviewer
‘After section 2D of the 1993 Act (inserted by section 8 of this Act) insert—
“Part 1B
THE CHARITY INDEPENDENT COMPLAINTS REVIEWER
2E The Charity Independent Complaints Reviewer
(1) There shall be a complaints reviewer to be known as the Charity Independent Complaints Reviewer (in this Act referred to as “the Reviewer”).
(2) The function of the Reviewer will be to investigate complaints against the Charity Commission’s performance of its regulatory role and, where appropriate, make financial awards of compensation against the Charity Commission, whether limited consolatory payments or unlimited payments for financial loss, and make recommendations.
(3) Except where the Reviewer finds the complainant has acted frivolously, vexatiously or unreasonably, the complainant shall not be required to pay any part of the costs of the investigation.
(4) No complainant shall be required to use any internal complaints procedure of the Charity Commission, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, the Charity Tribunal or the courts before the Reviewer will consider the case, and any consideration by the Reviewer will not prevent the case subsequently being considered by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration or the courts.
(5) The Reviewer shall be appointed by the Lord Chancellor on such other terms as he, after consultation, shall think fit.”’.—[Martin Horwood.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Martin Horwood: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I am grateful for that reminder, Mr. Gale, and I shall do my best to comply with it. The new clause is designed to place on a statutory basis the institution of the independent complaints reviewer. The office already exists, but the new clause would facilitate significant alterations to the current arrangements. There is an accusation that the independent complaints reviewer is, to an extent, the creature of the commission. If it is to continue to exist and to be useful even after the Bill creates the charity tribunal—we also have the alternative of the ombudsman route—some changes to the status of the independent reviewer could be instituted, and the new clause is designed to effect those.
In many respects, the new clause is self-explanatory. In opposing a similar suggestion in another place, the Minister, Lord Bassam of Brighton, suggested that the ombudsman route was advantageous. However, in practice that is not really available to many charities. As I said, in many respects the new clause speaks for itself and I will not detain the Committee any longer in proposing it, but I would be interested to hear hon. Members’ views on it.

Edward Miliband: The problem with the new clause is that it would give powers to the independent complaints reviewer that already exist for the parliamentary ombudsman. The danger is that it would confuse the parliamentary ombudsman’s situation. I refer the hon. Gentleman to the 2004-05 report by Jodi Berg, the independent complaints reviewer, who says on page 3:
“In particular, an argument has been made for a new statutory office of Independent Complaints Reviewer, changing the basis of appointment and affording the office holder the power to award substantive compensation to those adversely affected by the Commission’s actions or omissions.
My personal view is that some caution needs to be exercised in relation to this proposal. There is already a statutory avenue for complaints about the Charity Commission, that being the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, who is able to award redress for financial loss where she deems it necessary to do so. It is doubtful whether a potentially overlapping office would add anything for the citizen other than confusion. My own role, in common with other similar offices, is based on agreed terms of reference which underline my independence and authority.”
I tend to agree with the ICR.
There is a response open to the hon. Member for Cheltenham. He could ask, “How much power does the parliamentary ombudsman have, and will Government accept her recommendations?” I point out that the Charity Commission has always accepted the parliamentary ombudsman’s recommendations, which is an important record. I cannot speak for the commission, but I think that it is good that it has done so. I do not think that the new clause is advisable, and I hope that he will withdraw it.

Martin Horwood: I am grateful to the Minister for his comments. He needs to understand why the parliamentary ombudsman route is not available in practice for many charities. The independent complaints reviewer is not empowered even to recommend that the commission pay compensation where a charity has suffered loss as a result of its practices. It also routinely refuses to take up cases where there is a legal possibility of pursuing the commission for compensation through the courts. In practice, that route is potentially ruinously expensive for charities and therefore not a realistic option, but it effectively bars them from going to the ombudsman.
The proof of the pudding is in what has happenedin the past decade. Since the introduction of the Charities Act 1993, the parliamentary ombudsmanhas investigated only eight complaints about the commission’s conduct, upholding three and recommending financial compensation in two cases. There are clear grounds for the new clause and the financial compensation powers that I am proposing. I hope that if I withdraw it, the Minister will reflect on the role of the independent complaints review and the possibility of strengthening its powers, making access easier and introducing powers of financial compensation.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 9

Appointment and payment of the Receiver and Manager
‘(1) In section 19(1) of the Charities Act 1993, at end insert “subject to a public tender exercise conducted in line with best practice from the Office of Government Commerce.”
(2) In section 19(6)(b) of the Charities Act 1993 (c. 10), after “the income of the charities concerned”, insert “subject to a public tender exercise and up to a sum agreed in such an exercise, any additional costs to be met by the Commission.”’.—[Martin Horwood.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put,That the clause be read a Second time:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 8.

Question accordingly negatived.

New Clause 10

Property in trusts from residuary legacies
‘(1) After section 36(5) of the Charities Act 1993 (c.10) insert—
“(5A) References to a “charity trustee” in this section mean a trustee of the relevant charity or any proper officer with delegated authority from trustees.”
(2) After section 36(9) of the 1993 Act insert—
“(9A) Requirements in subsection (3), above, do not apply to any property under the value of £500,000 or a sum afterwards determined by an order, a draft of which has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”’.—[Martin Horwood.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Martin Horwood: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause was recommended by a learned friend, and I should be interested to hear the Minister’s response to it.

Edward Miliband: The new clause is about delegation, some of which I suspect has already taken place from Lord Phillips to the hon. Gentleman.
The first subsection of the new clause is unnecessary, because the law already allows charity trustees to delegate appropriately. The Charity Commission’s publication “The Essential Trustee: What You Need to Know” puts it like this:
“Trustees can generally delegate certain powers to agents or employees, but will and must always retain the ultimate responsibility for running the charity.”
In the context of section 36 of the 1993 Act, it means that in practice, trustees must personally make the initial decision to sell a property and the final decision to sell it on particular terms. In between, the trustees may and routinely do delegate the administration of the sale to their staff. That balance is right.
The second subsection of the new clause would remove important safeguards on sales of property worth less than £500,000. Since the hon. Gentleman appears to want to allow charities to sell their property without having it properly valued, one wonders how they will know how much it is worth in the first place. However, the serious point is that although he, as the beneficial owner of his own house, is free to sell it at whatever price he likes, the trustees of a charity do not have similar freedom. They must obtain and consider a written report from a qualified surveyor, and they are under a duty to dispose of their land only on the best terms.
The objection to the new clause is that essentially the duties on trustees to take expert advice and to sell only on the best terms reasonably obtainable should not be disapplied as the new clause suggests. They are important safeguards for the disposition of charity lands. However, I have a piece of good news. I understand the amendment’s deregulatory intent, and I undertake to review the regulations that set out what a surveyor’s report must contain. They were made in 1992 and may be seen as over-prescriptive, especially for smaller sales. Our review would aim to reduce the level of detailed prescription in the regulations.

Peter Bottomley: If the hon. Member for Cheltenham does not mind me saying so, the Minister is right. However, the Minister might want to include the exception—I am not sure how far it is covered by the 1992 provisions—that if a charity sells property to another charity, it does not have to get the best market price. It would be interesting to know whether some of the regulations under the Charities Act 1992 apply.

Edward Miliband: That process is already possible, but I shall consider the hon. Gentleman’s point. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member for Cheltenham is happy-ish, and will withdraw his new clause.

Martin Horwood: I am interested in the Minister’s response. I was surprised by his response to the first part of the new clause, which talks about the power to delegate to a proper officer. Part of the problem is that properties can be disposed of once in a blue moon by some charities, but when properties are left as part of a legacy, as they frequently are, the requirement for the trustees always to take the decision can be extremely onerous. I have talked to charities that were under the impression that that was the requirement in law, but the Minister’s response appears to go against it. Nevertheless, if that is the legal situation, and he has put it on the record, they might well be reassured.
In the second half of the new clause, the value of £500,000 is only indicative. It then says,
“or a sum afterwards determined”
by the Secretary of State. It is a rare and generous example of me offering rather than withdrawing latitude to the Secretary of State. However, I am reassured by the Minister’s statement, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the new clause.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 11

Small charities: remittance of fees
‘(1) Where any fee or charge is payable to a local authority under any enactment, the local authority may draw up and operate a scheme of fee remittances for any class of small charities.
(2) “Small charity” in this section means any charity with a turnover of less than £100,000 per year.’.—[Mr. Turner.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Andrew Turner: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I would be grateful if the Minister told me that the new clause complied with the Cheltenham principle, but I believe that it does not. It is intended to provide an additional power—although not, I emphasise, a duty—for local authorities to remit any fee that is payable to them by a charity, or to draw up and operate a scheme of remittances for such fees. I shall illustrate it, as one so often does, by reference to a local example. 
The people who run the Chale show, an agricultural show on the Isle of Wight, found that under the new licensing regime they had to pay £1,000 for a licence. Because their expected gate now exceeds the threshold set out in the Isle of Wight Acts, they had to comply with the requirements of those Acts as well, which cost another £3,000.

Peter Bottomley: Was the Isle of Wight Act pushed through by one of my hon. Friend’s predecessors, Mark Woodnutt, to stop an Isle of Wight pop festival after the three successful ones held about 30 years ago?

Andrew Turner: It was indeed. I should say that it has been amended twice since then, and the Isle of Wight has once again started holding extremely successful pop festivals, the most recent of which I did not attend because I could hear and enjoy it from my back garden. I attended the previous one and enjoyed it immensely. Some 60,000 people came this year, and I recommend the festivals to all hon. Members.
To get back to—

Roger Gale: The new clause.

Andrew Turner: When I raised the matter with councillors and officers of the Isle of Wight council, they told me they had no power to remit any fee payable under the Licensing Act 2003. If that is untrue, I will be glad to hear it. It occurred to me that they may also find themselves without the power to remit fees payable under other Acts, and that we ought to give them that power. It would be entirely discretionary; we are not forcing any local authority to spend any more money than it is currently spending.

Peter Bottomley: May I give wholehearted support to my hon. Friend’s new clause? A number of examples can properly be used. For example, on Remembrance Sunday, when organisations including the Royal British Legion want a temporary interruption to traffic, a regulation requires them to apply for a full traffic management order, and a fee is involved. Another example is that of a village that is going to have a popular regatta and wants to ban traffic on a road. In the past, that was done by custom and practice, but the law has been tightened up so that people have to apply for a temporary road closure order.

Helen Goodman: I am most grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising the issue, which is close to my heart and on which we have tabled amendments to another Bill going through the House, namely the Compensation Bill, which will deal with much of the problem.

Peter Bottomley: The Minister may accept the new clause, in which case further debates will not be necessary. The new clause might for some reason need further modification, or the Government might need to co-ordinate—perhaps the Minister will want to talk to the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government—to see whether giving the option suggested to local government would be acceptable across government. I know that it is acceptable to local government, which wants control over crucial charges. I strongly support the new clause.

Martin Horwood: I am delighted to have the opportunity at this late stage in our deliberations definitively and finally to restate the Cheltenham principle, which I believe is that if something such as the new clause might require the services of an extremely expensive lawyer to explain that it is not necessary, it might be worth putting it into legislation in the interests of clarity and transparency. If the officers of the Isle of Wight council are under the impression that it is necessary, it is worth supporting. I therefore support the new clause.

Edward Miliband: I am afraid that I disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s interpretation of the Cheltenham principle. As I remember it, as defined by my hon. Friend the Member for High Peak (Tom Levitt)—he will correct me if I am wrong—the principle relates to something that is nice but ineffective.

Martin Horwood: The exact wording used a long time ago was that an amendment that was
“harmless, but not entirely necessary”—[Official Report, Standing Committee A, 4 July 2006; c. 26.]
should be put into legislation.

Edward Miliband: I stand corrected. The question is whether the new clause fulfils the Cheltenham or any other principle. Local authorities can waive fees and charges to small charities in certain cases. For example, under the Controlled Waste Regulations 1992, local authorities have the discretion to waive a charge for waste collection from premises occupied by a charity.
There may be a danger that the new clause would drive a coach and horses through lots of national charges applied by local authorities. Perhaps the hon. Member for Isle of Wight would not mind that, but it would be more than my job’s worth. Having said that, I shall look at the issue properly and see whether I can take on board some of the spirit of the new clause and do something in a generous and charitable way.

Andrew Turner: I am grateful for the support of my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing, West. He mentioned regattas, and, implicitly, Sea View yacht club. I should mention that I am an honorary member of that club and, as such, a participant, although only from the land side, in the Sea View regatta from time to time.
I am pleased to hear that some fees for charities can be remitted and I am grateful to the Parliamentary Secretary for agreeing to consider the matter. I hope that we shall draw up a definitive list, perhaps before Report, of those local authorities.

Peter Bottomley: My hon. Friend is going backwards. Surely the whole point is not to draw up a definitive list, but say that if there is not already discretion for local authorities, they ought to have it.

Andrew Turner: I assure my hon. Friend that I was not going backwards, merely hoping that we could draw up the list, find out how few opportunities there were for local authorities to remit fees and return to the issue on Report with the support of the Parliamentary Secretary.

Peter Bottomley: I should like to put on record that I do not believe that the discretion exists for village halls and other organisations that need to go beyond their temporary entertainment licences. That is one of the things that the Minister should raise in his discussions with other people.

Andrew Turner: That example sprang to mind when national scales of charging were mentioned. I think I have said enough; in fact, I know I have—that does not need confirmation. I am grateful to the Parliamentary Secretary for agreeing to consider the matter and I shall question him closely about his progress on it as soon as we get back from the recess. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 13

Exercise of information powers
‘Before section 8 of the 1993 Act insert—
“Z8 Exercise of information powers
In undertaking any action under sections 19, 20 or 26, the Commission shall have regard to—
(a) the need to ensure that the burden on staff or volunteers of the charity is proportionate to the objectives of the action taken or proposed;
(b) the need to ensure that its costs are proportionate to the objectives of the action taken or proposed; and
(c) the extent to which the charity depends on regular donations from members of the public.”.’.—[Mr. Turner.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Andrew Turner: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This is another new clause to which the Cheltenham principle may be attributed, and I want to be sure of whether that is the case. I draw the Minister’s attention to paragraph (c) in particular. It is relevant to consider whether charities have close relations with members of the public, as do those that raise funds.

Edward Miliband: The Committee will recall that, last week, we spent some time discussing the duty on the Charity Commission to act proportionately. The Charity Commission has that duty, and that of acting reasonably. We have strengthened that by giving the commission a specific duty to have regard for the principles of best regulatory practice. Its regulatory activities should be proportionate, accountable, consistent, transparent and targeted only at cases for which they are needed.
That duty applies to all the commission’s functions, including those specified in the new clause. In reaching its decisions in respect of the exercise of its powers, the commission will take all relevant matters into account. On that basis, the commission will be required to follow best regulatory practice. I do not see the need for additional requirements, which would add confusion, not clarity. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the motion.

Andrew Turner: The Parliamentary Secretary has confirmed that paragraph (c) is covered. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 14

Disclosure of information to and by Northern Ireland regulator
‘(1) This section applies if a body (referred to in this section as “the Northern Ireland regulator”) is established to exercise functions in Northern Ireland which are similar in nature to the functions exercised in England and Wales by the Charity Commission.
(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations authorise relevant public authorities to disclose information to the Northern Ireland regulator for the purpose of enabling or assisting the Northern Ireland regulator to discharge any of its functions.
(3) If the regulations authorise the disclosure of Revenue and Customs information, they must contain provision in relation to that disclosure which corresponds to the provision made in relation to the disclosure of such information by section 10(2) to (4) of the 1993 Act (as substituted by paragraph 99 of Schedule 8 to this Act).
(4) In the case of information disclosed to the Northern Ireland regulator pursuant to regulations made under this section, any power of the Northern Ireland regulator to disclose the information is exercisable subject to any express restriction subject to which the information was disclosed to the Northern Ireland regulator.
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply in relation to Revenue and Customs information disclosed to the Northern Ireland regulator pursuant to regulations made under this section; but any such information may not be further disclosed except with the consent of the Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs.
(6) Any person specified, or of a description specified, in regulations made under this section who discloses information in contravention of subsection (5) is guilty of an offence and liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine, or both.
(7) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (5) of disclosing information to prove that he reasonably believed—
(a) that the disclosure was lawful, or
(b) that the information had already and lawfully been made available to the public.
(8) In the application of this section to Scotland or Northern Ireland, the reference to 12 months in subsection (6) is to be read as a reference to 6 months.
(9) In this section—
“relevant public authority” means—
(a) any government department (other than a Northern Ireland department),
(b) any local authority in England, Wales or Scotland,
(c) any person who is a constable in England and Wales or Scotland,
(d) any other body or person discharging functions of a public nature (including a body or person discharging regulatory functions in relation to any description of activities), except a body or person whose functions are exercisable only or mainly in or as regards Northern Ireland and relate only or mainly to transferred matters;
“Revenue and Customs information” means information held as mentioned in section 18(1) of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 (c. 11);
“transferred matter” has the same meaning as in the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (c.Â 47).’.—[Edward Miliband.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 15

Human rights compliance
‘(1) The Commission shall investigate the activities of a charity where it receives an allegation, substantiated by evidence, that the charity, acting in concert with a government (whether or not a party to the European Convention on Human Rights) has committed an act which, had it been committed by a public authority, would have been inconsistent with a Convention right as defined in the Human Rights Act 1998.
(2) If, following any such investigation, the Commission finds the allegation proven, it shall either, if the charity is registered, strike the charity off the register or exercise its other statutory powers in relation to the charity, its property or assets or its charity trustees, officers or employees.’.—[Peter Bottomley.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Peter Bottomley: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Cheltenham principle has been cited many times, but not by me; it will be now. The Bill is riddled with the substitution of the words “the commission is” for the words “the commission are”. That is Cheltenham all the way through.
I now turn to something rather more serious. I tabled the new clause very late, and so the Committee ought to know that if the Minister gives any kind of response, I do not intend to push it to a vote. Secondly, many of us have had correspondence from Benedict Birnberg, Uri Davis, Roland Rance and David Wolton. Those who have read the correspondence will know about the issue that they had in mind, but I do not think that it is appropriate for the Committee to become involved in that in any sense whatsoever.
The new clause is about human rights compliance, and I am relying quite heavily on a letter that Benedict Birnberg and his colleagues sent to the Minister, dated 26 June. I shall also be quoting from a letter sent to the Charities Bill team on 3 June. The proposed new clause 
“is framed to make it clear...that English charities may not engage in activities which, were they committed by a public authority, would be inconsistent with Convention rights as defined in the Human Rights Act 1998 and to mandate”—
to require—
“the Charities Commission to investigate and take appropriate action against charities which are alleged to do so by exercising its statutory powers.”
The allegation by itself should not be sufficient. The wording of the proposed amendment by which I have been assisted was based on the advice, I am told, of a senior member of the judiciary.
The letter dated 3 June is from correspondence with the Charity Commission and the charities unit, which has now moved to the Minister’s Department from the Home Office. It has been put to Benedict Birnberg and his colleagues that existing charity law is sufficient to empower the Charity Commission to take action to deal with the abuses that were alleged when a complaint was put forward against a particular charitable trust. In fact, the petitioners, if I can put it that way, supported the view that the law was sufficient. That is why they wrote to the commission, seeking the investigation of the activities that they alleged contravened international human rights laws.
The Charity Commission rejected the complaint, taking the view that it operated within a statutory framework that precluded it from undertaking such an investigation, let alone from having the power to cause any remedial action. The petitioners considered, as they argue in the letter, that there was a gap in charity law that needed to be filled, namely the deficient powers, as they saw it, of the commission to monitor and intervene in the affairs of a UK charity alleged to be engaged in activities that would be incompatible with the Human Rights Act 1998 were it to be a public authority.

Robert Flello: The hon. Gentleman raises an extremely important and serious matter. Could he explain to me, as I am confused, his position in relation to his hon. and right hon. Friends, who appear to have a problem with the Human Rights Act and think that perhaps we should get rid of it?

Peter Bottomley: No.
The petitioners continued that they carefully considered what the Charities Bill team sent back, but that it reinforced their concerns. They were told that charity law provides remedies either in circumstances when the charity’s
“purposes cease to be charitable under English law”
or in circumstances when the charity
“carries out unacceptable activities (for example, activities that are unlawful...)”.
The whole point is that because charity law is, in the petitioners’ view, so unspecific and lacking in clarity and the existing statutory powers of intervention so limited, that prompts the question of what purposes are non-charitable and what charity activities are unacceptable or unlawful.
In the absence of clear statutory precepts, the reaction of the commission to the petitioners’ complaint and to similar complaints is bound to be as it was. There is no criticism of the commission in what has been said, but rather it has been questioned whether there is a gap in the law. It may be that charity law needs amending—and the petitioners would say that it certainly does—to make it explicit that an English charity, or for that matter any charity anywhere in the United Kingdom, may not engage in activities that contravene international human rights provisions and standards, and that the commission is mandated to intervene if it does so.
The proposal that was first discussed in correspondence has been changed and its most recent form is the new clause that I am offering to the Committee today. The particular wording does not matter, but the commission wishes to see—and there is an argument here that the Committee might wish to consider—an amendment that satisfied the principle behind the concerns. The underlying issue is whether non-state institutions have obligations under human rights treaties and if so, to what degree. The purpose of the new clause is to make it explicit that UK charities not only are expected to comply with international human rights standards, but can be required to do so.
There are other matters contained in a letter that could come up if we return to the issue later, but I have spelled out the issue and the responses from the Charities Bill unit, which was very open, and the Charity Commission. The underlying question is not whether the law is being applied or interpreted properly, but whether there is a gap in the law. The Committee might benefit from hearing the Minister’s response.

Andrew Turner: I do not want to detain the Committee, for obvious reasons, but one issue about international activity by charities that has been drawn to my attention—and to which the Minister might slip in a response in replying to the debate—is the extent to which the commission has a duty to ascertain that money raised in this country for charitable purposes is spent for charitable purposes overseas. We know that that is the duty of the charity and of the commission; the question is whether they have the capacity to discharge it.
I am concerned because of allegations, of which I am sure Ministers and hon. Members are aware, that some religious charities in this country remit considerable funds overseas, where they are spent for purposes that are only borderline religious, at least in the sense that that is understood in the United Kingdom.

Martin Horwood: I am grateful to the hon. Member for Worthing, West for raising this difficult and serious issue. Things are difficult, partly because the example that the correspondence has raised seems to rest on the territorial nature of the charity. Geographical restriction as a principle is well established in charity law as a perfectly legitimate restriction that would not contradict public benefit. To introduce a new clause that appears to detract from the commission’s ability to judge public benefit on a broad basis seems to narrow the commission’s remit.
Although I am sympathetic to the new clause, it opens a door to further attempts to define more narrowly, in ways outside the public benefit test, exactly how the commission behaves. However, the issue is serious and I should like a reassurance from the Minister that, under his interpretation of the Bill, charities that engaged in activities that fell short of human rights standards would not pass a new public benefit test, and that activities undertaken overseas that are widely accepted as being charitable—in the case of Oxfam and many others that is well established—but which fall short of proper human rights standards should not pass the public benefit test either.

Edward Miliband: This is a fitting new clause to discuss in our last debate. The hon. Member for Worthing, West has raised a complex but important subject, although I shall not be able to give a substantive and definitive answer today, because the issues are incredibly complex and involve many parts of government.

Robert Flello: The hon. Member for Worthing, West was unable to clear the fog over whether those on the Opposition Benches wish to get rid of the Human Rights Act 1998. Will my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary consider the additional costs that would be incumbent on a charity when looking at the legal implications of making sure that it was complying with the Human Rights Act each time that it did something?

Edward Miliband: My hon. Friend makes a fair point. We must bear in mind three issues. First, such a proposal would require quite detailed investigative action by the commission. Secondly, that action would be outside Great Britain and, thirdly, there is much wider issue about the extent to which non-state actors are subject to the European convention on human rights.
Let me deal with each issue briefly. Of course, the commission has investigative powers and can exercise them, although the sort of investigation that would be involved when making a judgment about human rights standards would be incredibly complex. Without going into a particular case in detail, it is clear from the new clause that the issues involved would be extremely deep and complicated.
The second issue is the power of the Charity Commission outside Great Britain. It can visit other countries to look into allegations, but its staff cannot exercise any powers outside England and Wales. Its powers of investigation under the Bill are confined to England and Wales. That limits its ability to investigate outside the United Kingdom in the way suggested under the new clause, although it can, of course, hold trustees in England and Wales fully accountable for the charity’s activities.
I come now to the third and most fundamental issue, which is the extent to which the ECHR applies to non-state actors. For most purposes, a charity would not usually be subject to the Human Rights Act, which places a duty on public authorities not to act incompatibly with the convention rights. It is possible that a charity could be a public authority were it to be exercising a public functions, such as the provision of publicly funded care. However, it would be extremely unlikely ever to be exercising such a function overseas.
The new clause would be a new departure because it would place obligations on a charity not necessarily in its role as a public authority to comply with the ECHR. That is the Government’s view of the new clause. However, given its importance, the lucid way in which the hon. Member for Worthing, West presented it and the distinguished nature of those who have contacted us, it deserves a more substantive reply than I have been able to give. I shall endeavour at least to report back to the Committee in some form or another on our view. Obviously, the matter can be raised on Report.

Andrew Turner: We must be aware of two issues, the first of which concerns when remittances are made outside the United Kingdom or England and Wales. I do not know what powers the commission has in respect of Scotland and Northern Ireland. Should the trustees be expected to demonstrate a higher level of awarenessin such circumstances so that they can show the commission that money has been properly spent than would be the case if that money were spent in England and Wales?
The second question impinges on that. I believe that I am right in saying that a charity may currently have objectives for a particular racial or ethnic group. Were such an amendment accepted, would it have an effect on certain existing charities in England and Wales?

Edward Miliband: I feel that I am already skating on legal thin ice. The hon. Gentleman’s question is valid and I shall address it in any substantive answer that I give to the Committee on the new clause. The issue is important and I thank him for raising it. I shall endeavour to come back with a more substantive reply at a later date.

Peter Bottomley: The Minister may find that the issue should be dealt with by written statement or on Report. We have nearly finished our work so he will not be able to come back to the Committee. In passing, may I say to the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Flello) that I was advised, at the time that I was first elected, that bringing up a straightforward party point in the middle of a serious debate does not always carry the reputation of the Committee forward?
The Minister has dealt fairly with my points. He may have added some additional ones, because my new clause does not refer to extraterritoriality, though the example behind it is there. I fully understand the reluctance of the Charity Commission to be bound up in investigating things that may have happened—they did happen in one particular case 50 years ago—in the middle of one of the most complex areas of pain and disorder that one could imagine. Even if what I am proposing is right and acceptable, I can see that there would be arguments of practicality. For instance, what would it open up in terms of consequence? At the moment, however, there remains the question of what is right.
I should perhaps declare that I think that I was a fellow trustee with Benedict Birnberg on the Canon Collins Educational Trust for Southern Africa—the follow-up to the Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa. The Defence and Aid Fund was not charitable, but the Canon Collins trust was. What has been said by Benedict Birnberg and his colleagues and the way that the new clause has been proposed do not necessarily open up many of the problems that have been discussed in our brief debate. Will the Minister consider whether the approach in the new clause is right, proper and useful, and whether it is controllable? I know that he is not committed to accepting it, but I should be grateful for his reflections. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the Chairman do report the Bill, as amended.

Edward Miliband: On a point of order. Mr. Gale, I want to say some thank yous. This is as close as I shall get to the Oscar ceremony, but I promise that my speech will not be as long as those at the Oscar ceremony—although as I understand it, I have until9 o’clock.
Let me start by thanking the Doorkeepers, the police, the Clerk and the staff of the Committee for their hard work during the last two weeks.

Peter Bottomley: And the official reporters.

Edward Miliband: And the official reporters—I am extremely grateful to them for their work and dedication to their job. I also thank my officials, led by Richard Corden. I can reveal to the Committee that he has had the privilege of working in the strategy unit on the report that led to the Bill, then going to the Charity Commission to reply to the Bill, and then coming into Government to implement the Bill—a real hat trick. He has ably led what is a very able team of officials.
I also thank the members of the Committee. On my own side there was a glittering array of talent. They have engaged very much with the Bill—mainly constructively. My hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman) had 11 amendments of her own, which showed her reputation for independence. My right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth has brought his great expertise to the subject and to the Committee, and I am very grateful to him.
My hon. Friend the Member for High Peak (Tom Levitt) has coined a new principle, which I expect will endure beyond this Committee. I am grateful to all Members of this Committee, especially my hon. Friends the Members for City of Durham (Dr. Blackman-Woods) and for West Bromwich, West (Mr. Bailey) who have been extremely kind to me. Most importantly, my hon. Friend the Member for Erewash (Liz Blackman) has kept me in order as I predicted that she would do.
Let me also pay tribute to some notable contributions on the other side, including the hon. Member for Worthing, West and the hon. Member for Cheltenham who has asked me many difficult questions to which I have not known the answer. I also pay tribute to the hon. Member for Cheltenham who has brought good humour and a new principle to this debate and to the hon. Member for Isle of Wight who has brought his considerable talents and assiduousness to the work of this Committee. Finally, thanks to Mrs. Humble and to yourself, Mr. Gale, for your stern, but fair, chairmanship. Finally, I think that we have met the two principles of being a charity: charitable purpose and public benefit. I thank all members of the Committee.

Andrew Turner: Further to that point of order, Mr. Gale, may I endorse the remarks of the Parliamentary Secretary? I am grateful to those whom he has mentioned and my failure to repeat them individually is not an indication that I am not genuinely grateful to them. I am also grateful to him for his forbearance on occasions, assistance on many occasions and genuine agreement and attempt to reach consensus wherever possible on the further proceedings of this Bill.
I am grateful to my hon. Friends and in particular, my hon. Friend the Member for Upminster (Angela Watkinson) for her assistance, to my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing, West for the great knowledge that he has brought to the Bill and to my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham in providing a useful “butt”. I also acknowledge the support of my research assistant. I think the job of a virgin Front Bencher depends heavily on the assistance of their research support.
I am grateful to the officials of the Charity Commission which has responded to my frequent letters, and to the hon. Gentleman’s predecessor, the Under-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale, East (Paul Goggins) for having been quick to respond to my many inquiries.

Martin Horwood: Further to that point of order, Mr. Gale, I would like to add my thanks to yourself and Mrs. Humble for the firm but fair way in which you have regulated us. My thanks to the Clerks and the officials, both those who are present and those in the Minister’s office who have worked hard behind the scenes to help the Committee proceed.
The spirit in which this Committee has undertaken its deliberations is in contrast to my only other experience of a Bill in Committee, which was rather more confrontational, less humorous and less constructive. The Bill will be received well by the voluntary sector. The spirit in which the Bill has proceeded as a piece of legislation is exemplary. The Minister’s tone and attitude in responding and listening to the points that we made in a serious way reflected well on him.
I pay credit to my researcher, Jake Rigg and the hard work that he and Elizabeth Fosten have done in my office to try and take me as a fellow Committee virgin through this process. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Isle of Wight for describing my “butt” as useful. I will try and think of a comparable comment for him. I take it in the spirit in which I assume that it was meant. Finally, I thank the hon. Member for High Peak for recognising that Cheltenham is indeed a town that deserves its own principle.

Peter Bottomley: Further to that point of order, Mr. Gale, if Back Benchers are allowed to join in this exchange of thanks and praise, I am glad that the Minister referred to those who backed him up—those in his Department and the Charity Commission. However, I do not think that we have mentioned trustees or the charity lawyers who give them guidance. They deserve to be mentioned for their attention to what has gone on, not just in Committee, but in previous years. The lawyers will also be helping trustees when the Bill comes into force.
The way in which the Front Benchers have led the debates has been exemplary. I say to the Minister, in the hope of doing his party as much damage as possible, he deserves his place on the Front Bench and the sooner that he gets into opposition and lets us take over his role, the better.

Tom Levitt: Further to that point of order, Mr. Gale, I never thought that I would rise, accused of having said that Liberals have principles. I know that the Cheltenham principle will be forever with us and brings a warm glow to the heart of my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich, West, who is a native of Cheltenham.
On a serious note, I do not expect that on Report we will bring too much controversy or dissent. Over the four days of our work, we have witnessed a serious and timely updating of charity law which, as we know, has been with us for 400 years. I believe that the importance of the voluntary and community sectors, and the third sector generally, is in logarithmic phase at the moment and is of ever increasing value and importance. I am proud to have served with colleagues on both side of the House in taking the matter forward.

Roger Gale: In the spirit of charity and public service, I have listened to the remarks of the past 10 minutes with great interest and I have been unable to discern any matter that is properly a point of order for the Chair. However, continuing in that vein, I thank all Committee members, on behalf of Mrs. Humble and myself, for the courtesy and good humour with which deliberations have been conducted. That always makes life much easier. I add my thanks to the officers and staff of the House, without whom our work would be impossible.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.

Committee rose at eight minutes to Four o’clock.